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Abstract 
We develop a new dataset using UNESCO source materials on the location of nearly 15,000 universities in 
about 1,500 regions across 78 countries, some dating back to the 11th Century. We estimate fixed effects 
models at the sub-national level between 1950 and 2010 and find that increases in the number of 
universities are positively associated with future growth of GDP per capita (and this relationship is robust 
to controlling for a host of observables, as well as unobserved regional trends). Our estimates imply that 
doubling the number of universities per capita is associated with 4% higher future GDP per capita. 
Furthermore, there appear to be positive spillover effects from universities to geographically close 
neighbouring regions. We show that the relationship between growth and universities is not simply driven 
by the direct expenditures of the university, its staff and students. Part of the effect of universities on 
growth is mediated through an increased supply of human capital and greater innovation (although the 
magnitudes are not large). We find that within countries, higher historical university presence is associated 
with stronger pro-democratic attitudes. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A striking feature of the last hundred years has been the enormous expansion in university 
education. In 1900, only about one in a hundred young people in the world were enrolled at 
universities, but over the course of the Twentieth Century this rose to one in five (Schofer and 
Meyer, 2005). The term “university” was coined by the University of Bologna, founded in 1088, 
the first of the medieval universities. These were communities with administrative autonomy, 
courses of study, publicly recognised degrees and research objectives and were distinct from the 
religion-based institutions that came before (De Ridder-Symoens, 1992). Since then, universities 
spread worldwide in broadly the same form, and it has been argued that they were an important 
force in the Commercial Revolution through the development of legal institutions (Cantoni and 
Yuchtman, 2014) and the industrial revolution through their role in the building of knowledge and 
its dissemination (Mokyr, 2002). 
While there is an extensive literature on human capital and growth, there is relatively little 
research on the economic impact of universities themselves. In this paper, we develop a new 
dataset on the location of universities in 1,500 regions across 78 countries, and explore how 
university formation has influenced economic growth since 1950, when consistent sub-national 
economic data are first available. This period is of particular interest because in the years following 
World War II, university expansion accelerated in most countries; a trend partially driven by the 
view that higher education is essential for economic and social progress. This was in contrast to 
the pre-War fears of “over-education” that were prevalent in many countries, should enrolments 
much extend beyond the national elites (Schofer and Meyer, 2005; Goldin and Katz, 2008).  
There are a number of channels through which universities may affect growth including (i) 
greater skill supply; (ii) more innovation; (iii) support for democratic values; and (iv) demand. 
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Firstly, and most obviously, universities are producers of human capital; and skilled workers tend 
to be more productive than unskilled workers. Distance seems to matter for the probability of 
attending college (e.g. Card, 2001) and also the likelihood that students will remain as workers in 
the same area as the university itself. The empirical macro literature has generally found that at the 
country level, human capital (typically measured by years of schooling) is important for 
development and growth. Growth accounting and development accounting relate educational 
attainment to economic performance and find a non-trivial contribution.1 Explicit econometric 
analysis usually, although not always, confirms this.2  
A problem with these empirical studies is that they are at the country level and subject to 
serious endogeneity concerns (e.g. Bils and Klenow, 2000; Hanusheck and Woessman, 2009). At 
the sub-national level, Gennaioli et al. (2013) show that regional years of schooling is important 
for regional GDP per capita in the cross section and Gennaioli et al. (2014) confirm this 
relationship also holds for growth. Furthermore, human capital appears to also have an indirect 
effect via externalities which are analysed inter alia by Gennaioli et al. (2013) using international 
data (where regional human capital is found to raise firm level productivity, over and above firm 
level human capital) and Moretti (2004) (where human capital in US cities is found to raise 
individual wages). In an historical setting, Squicciarini and Voigtländer (2014) show that “upper 
tail” knowledge was important in the industrial revolution, and they measure this type of 
knowledge using city level subscriptions to the Encyclopédie in mid-18th century France. 
A second channel through which universities may affect growth is innovation. This effect 
may be direct as university researchers themselves produce innovations, or indirect via 
1 For example, Mankiw et al. (1992), Hall and Jones (1994) and Caselli (2005). 
2 For example, Barro (1991) and more recently, de La Fuente and Domenech (2006) and Cohen and Soto (2007) 
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universities’ role as human capital producers, should graduates enter the workforce and innovate. 
A number of papers have found that universities increase local innovative capacity.3 A drawback 
of this literature is that it looks at an indirect cause of growth using proxies for innovation such as 
patents rather than at output directly. Moreover, the work is also focused on single countries, hence 
limiting its generalizability. 
A third way universities may matter is by fostering pro-growth institutions. Universities 
could promote strong institutions directly by providing a platform for democratic dialogue and 
sharing of ideas, through events, publications, or reports to policy makers. A more obvious channel 
would be that universities strengthen institutions via their role as human capital producers. The 
relationship between human capital, institutions and growth are much debated in the literature. 
There is controversy over whether institutions matter at all for growth.4 Some papers have argued 
that human capital is the basic source of growth, and the driver of democracy and improved 
institutions (e.g. Glaeser et al., 2004). But the relationship between education and 
democracy/institutions is contested by Acemoglu et al. (2005b) who show that the effects found 
                                                 
 
3 Jaffe (1989) uses US state level data to provide evidence of commercial spillovers from university research in 
patenting (in specific technical sectors) and R&D spending by firms, and Jaffe et al. (1993) provides more evidence 
for localization by comparing the distances between citations and cited patents. Belenzon and Schankerman (2013) 
look more closely at the distance between the location of university patents, and the firms that cite them in subsequent 
patents. They find that university knowledge spillovers are strongly localized. Hausman (2012) finds that universities 
stimulate nearby economic activity via the spread of innovation: long run employment and pay rises in sectors closely 
tied with a local university’s innovative strength, and this impact increases in proximity to university. Toivanen and 
Väänänen (2014) consider how universities affect innovation via their role as human capital producers: they use 
distance to a technical university as an instrument in estimating the effect of engineering education on patents in 
Finland (which they find to be positive and significant). They perform a counterfactual calculation which suggests 
that establishing three new technical universities resulted in a 20 per cent increase in USPTO patents in Finland. They 
suggest that the effects that universities have on their local economies may grow over time as the composition of local 
industries adjusts. While much of this effect is likely to be due to innovation spillovers, it may also capture other types 
of agglomeration externalities.  
4 See, for example, Acemoglu et al. (2005a, 2014) who argue institutions matter a lot, and Gerring et al. (2005) for a 
summary of papers that conclude that they do not. 
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in the cross section of countries are not robust to including country fixed effects and exploiting 
within-country variation.   
Finally, universities may affect growth through a more mechanical “demand” channel. 
Increased consumption from students and staff and the universities’ purchase of local goods and 
services from the region could in principle have a material impact on GDP. This would occur when 
university costs are financed though national governments from tax revenues raised mainly outside 
the region where the university is located. 
In this paper, we develop a new dataset using the World Higher Education Database 
(WHED) which is produced by the International Association of Universities in association with 
UNESCO. We map the location of over 15,000 universities into 1,500 regions across 78 countries 
to explore how changes in the number of universities within regions have affected subsequent 
growth.  
We show that university growth has a strong association with later GDP per capita growth 
at the sub-national level. Even after including a host of controls (including country or region fixed 
effects to control for differential regional trends, and year dummies) we find that a doubling of 
universities in a region is associated with over 4% higher GDP per capita. We show that reverse 
causality does not appear to be driving this, nor do mechanical demand effects. We also find that 
universities in neighboring regions or other regions in a country also affect a region’s growth, and 
there appears to be a spatial element to this, with larger effects for regions that are close together. 
Finally, we show that the university effect works through increasing the supply of human capital 
and also through raising innovation, but both these channels are small in magnitude. In addition, 
we find that universities appear to affect views on democracy even when we control or human 
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capital, consistent with a story that they may have some role in shaping institutions over longer 
time horizons. 
The strength of our paper is the comprehensiveness of the dataset in terms of the coverage 
of sub-national regions and time periods. We do not have plausible instruments for university 
location, but the correlations are highly suggestive as we can control for a wide source of region-
specific trends and observable confounders. 
To date, few papers have explicitly considered the direct link between university presence 
and economic performance. Cantoni and Yuchtman (2014) provide evidence that medieval 
universities in 14th century Germany played a causal role in the commercial revolution. In a 
contemporary setting, Aghion et al. (2009) consider the impact of research university activity on 
US states. Using political instruments, they find that exogenous increases in investments in four 
year college education affect growth and patenting. Kantor and Whalley (2014) estimate local 
agglomeration spillovers from US research university activity, using university endowment values 
and stock market shocks as an instrument for university spending. They find evidence for local 
spillover effects to firms, which is larger for research intensive universities or firms that are 
“technologically closer” to universities.5 Feng and Valero (2016) use international data to show 
that firms that are closer to universities have higher Bloom et al (2016) management scores.   
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data and some of its key features 
including interesting trends and correlations which give us a macro level understanding of the 
global rise in universities over time. Section III sets out our econometric strategy, and Section IV 
5 In related work, Kantor and Whalley (2016) explore agricultural productivity effects of proximity to research in US 
agricultural research stations, they find that effects peak between 20-30 years after the experiment stations opened, 
with some longer term persistence where stations focused on basic research and farmers were already at the technology 
frontier. 
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our results. Section V explores the mechanisms through which universities appear to affect 
regional growth and finally, Section VI provides some concluding comments. 
II. DATA
Our regression analysis is based upon information on universities in some 1,500 regions in
78 countries. This represents the set of regions for which our university data can be mapped to a 
regional time series of key economic variables obtained from Gennaioli et al. (2014), and covers 
over 90 per cent of global GDP.6 We first describe the full World Higher Education Database 
(WHED) across all countries, with some key global trends and correlations. Then we focus on the 
78 countries for which regional economic data are available, describing how we aggregate the 
WHED data into regions, and present some initial descriptive evidence. 
II.1 World Higher Education Database
WHED is an online database published by the International Association of Universities in 
collaboration with UNESCO.7 It contains information on higher education institutions that offer 
at least a three or four year professional diploma or a post-graduate degree. In 2010, there were 
16,326 universities across 185 countries meeting this criterion. The database therefore excludes, 
for example, community colleges in the US and further education institutions in the UK and may 
be thought of as a sample of “higher quality” universities. The Data Appendix contains more 
discussion on countries and types of institution omitted. Key variables of interest include 
university location, founding date, subjects and qualifications offered and other institutional details 
such as how they are funded.  
6 Based on World Bank GDP in 2014 (US dollars, PPP). 
7 For more information, see http://www.whed.net/home.php. 
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Our regional analysis is based on that sample of countries for which GDP and other data 
are available from 1955, which covers 78 countries, comprising 14,868 (or 91%) of the institutions 
from the full listing. Our baseline results simply use the year-specific count of universities by 
region as a measure of university presence, always controlling for region population. To calculate 
this, we first allocate each university to a region (for example, a US state), and then use the 
founding dates of universities in each region to determine the number of universities that were 
present at any particular date.8 High rates of university exit would invalidate this type of approach, 
but we find that this does not appear to be an issue over the decades since the 1950s (see the Data 
Appendix for an extensive discussion). This is because there has been very little exit from the 
university sector over this period. 
A disadvantage of the “university density” measure is that it does not correct for the size 
or quality of the university. Unfortunately, this type of data is not available on a consistent basis 
across all countries. So we present robustness results on sub-samples where we do have finer 
grained measure of university size and quality to make sure our baseline results are not misleading. 
II.2 The Worldwide Diffusion of Universities
We begin by presenting some descriptive analysis of the university data at the macro level 
using the full university database. Figure 1 shows how the total number of universities has evolved 
over time; marking the years that the number doubled. The world’s first university opened in 1088 
(in Bologna) and growth took off in the 19th Century, growing most rapidly in the post-World War 
II period (see Panel A). In Panel B we normalize the number of worldwide universities by the 
global population to show that university density also rose sharply in the 1800s. It continued to 
8 Of the full sample of 16,326 universities, we were unable to obtain founding date information for 669 institutions 
(4% of the total). 609 of these fall into our core analysis sample (in the 78 countries for which regional economic data 
are available). These institutions are therefore omitted from analysis. 
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rise in the 20th Century, albeit at a slower rate and has accelerated again after the 1980s when 
emerging countries like Brazil and India saw rapid expansions in universities.  
A number of additional descriptive charts are in the online Appendix. We find that in 2010, 
the distribution of universities across countries is skewed, with seven countries (US, Brazil, 
Philippines, Mexico, Japan, Russia and India, in descending order) accounting for over half of the 
universities in the world (Figure A1). The US is the country with the largest share, accounting for 
13% of the world’s universities. We also examine the “extensive margin” – the cumulative number 
of countries that have any university over time (Figure A2). The UK opened its first university in 
1167 (University of Oxford) and the US in 1636 (Harvard University). The latest country to open 
a university in our data is Bhutan in 2003. By 2010, the vast majority of countries in the world 
have at least one university. Appendix A1.3 gives an historical overview of the diffusion of 
universities from the 1880s in four advanced economies: France, Germany, the UK and US, and 
two emerging economies: India and China. We compare the timing of historical university 
expansions to growth and industrialisation. Descriptively, the data looks broadly in line with the 
thesis of Mokyr (2002) that the building and dissemination of knowledge played an important role 
in the industrialization of many countries. 
We also examine the cross sectional correlations of universities with key economic 
variables at the country level (Figure A3). Unsurprisingly, we find that higher university density 
is associated with higher GDP per capita levels. It is interesting that countries with more 
universities in 1960 generally had higher growth rates over 1960-2000. Furthermore, there are 
strong correlations between universities and average years of schooling, patent applications and 
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democracy.9  These correlations provide a basis for us to explore further whether universities 
matter for GDP growth within countries, and to what extent any effect operates via human capital, 
innovation or institutions. 
II.4 Regional Economic Data 
We obtain regional economic data from Gennaioli et al. (2014) who collated key economic 
variables for growth regressions at the sub-national level. The outcome variable we focus on is 
regional GDP per capita. Since for many countries, regional GDP data and other variables such as 
population or years of education are not available annually we follow Barro (2012) and compute 
average annual growth rates in GDP per capita over five year periods.10 We also gather patents 
data at the regional level as a measure of innovation. For the US only, we obtain USPTO data at 
the state level over the period 1965-1999 from the NBER (Hall et al., 2001). For 38 countries, we 
obtain region-level European Patent Office (EPO) patents from the OECD REGPAT database 
covering 1975 to 2005. 
As an initial investigation, we examine the regional cross sectional correlations between 
universities and regional GDP per capita, based on the year 2000 – where data for 65 countries out 
of the full sample are available. Column (1) of Table 1 shows that there is a significant and positive 
correlation between GDP per capita and universities: controlling for population, a 1% increase in 
the number of universities is associated with 0.7% higher GDP per capita. Column (2) includes 
country fixed effects which reduces the university coefficient substantially from 0.680 to 0.214. 
We include a host of further geographic controls in column (3) - whether the region contains a 
                                                 
 
9 We use Polity scores as a measure of democracy, as is common in the literature. See for example Acemoglu et al. 
(2014) 
10 We interpolate missing years, but do not extrapolate beyond the final year (or before the first year of data). Our 
results are robust to dropping interpolated data. 
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capital city, latitude, inverse distance to ocean, malaria ecology and the log of cumulative oil and 
gas production.11 This reduces the coefficient on universities still further to 0.160. In column (4) 
we add years of education. This reduces the coefficient on universities by around two-thirds.12 In 
column (5) we restrict to the sample for which patents data are available, and add years of 
education in column (6). Again, this reduces the impact of universities, by about half. In column 
(7) we see that adding a measure of patent “stock” reduces our coefficient on universities by a 
further 28% to 0.0565, but it remains highly significant. This analysis suggests that universities 
may contribute to higher GDP per capita mainly as human capital producers, but also as producers 
of innovation.  
The correlations in Table 1 are purely cross sectional and there could be a multitude of 
unobservables that can lead regions to have both higher GDP per capita and more universities. Our 
focus therefore turns to growth rates for the bulk of our analysis which allows us to sweep out the 
time invariant factors. Figure 2 shows that the raw correlations between growth rates of universities 
and GDP per capita that we saw at the country level are also present within countries. Panel A 
simply plots the average annual growth in regional GDP per capita on the average annual growth 
in universities for each region, over the time period for which data are available (which differs by 
region). Average GDP per capita growth rates are plotted within 20 evenly sized bins of university 
growth, and country fixed effects are absorbed so that variation is within region. Panel B plots 
GDP per capita growth rates on lagged university growth for the 8,128 region-years (on which we 
conduct the core of our analysis that will follow). In both graphs it is clear that there is a positive 
11 Specifically, we take the natural log of 1+ this value, so that we retain zeroes in our sample. 
12 The coefficient on years of education is highly significant and similar in magnitude to the cross section results in 
Gennaioli et al. (2013). In regressions of regional income per capita on years of education, controlling for geographic 
characteristics, Gennaioli et al. (2013) estimate a coefficient of 0.2763, see their Table IV column (2). 
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relationship. In addition, these graphs show that there are observations in the top bin with very 
high university growth. We explore which region-years were driving this found that they are 
evenly spread across 60 countries and different years, so they do not appear to be data errors. 
Dropping the observations in the highest growth bin actually strengthens the correlation in this 
simple scatter plot. We keep all the data in the main regressions, but show that the results are robust 
to dropping these observations or winsorizing lagged university growth. 
Table 2 has some descriptive statistics of our sample of 8,128 region-years. The average 
region has GDP per capita of just over $13,000, average growth of 2% per annum and nearly ten 
universities (this is quite skewed with a median of 2, so in our robustness tests, we show that our 
results are not sensitive to dropping region-years with no universities).13 As we set out in the next 
section, our core regressions will control for population levels and growth, and a number of 
geographic characteristics – including an indicator for whether a region contains a country’s capital 
(this is the case for 5 per cent of the observations). Measures of regional human capital (college 
share and years of education) are available for sub-samples of region-years. In those samples, the 
average region-year has a college share of seven per cent and average years of education of just 
over seven. 
III. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
The underlying model we are interested in is the long run relationship between universities
and economic performance:  
(1) 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑌𝑌/𝐿𝐿)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑈𝑈𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−5) +𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−5′ 𝛼𝛼2 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
13 A related fact is that the median growth rate of the number of universities is zero (5,736 observations). We also 
checked that the results are not driven by regions that increased their number of universities from zero to one or more. 
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Where (𝑌𝑌/𝐿𝐿)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the level of GDP per capita for region i, in country c, and year t and 
𝑈𝑈𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−5 is the lagged number of universities in the region plus 1 (so that we include observations 
where there are no universities in our analysis). We lag this to allow for the effect that the impact 
of universities is unlikely to be immediate and since we estimate in 5 year differences, using the 
fifth lag is natural (we also show longer distributed lags). In addition, using the lag means that we 
eliminate the effects of a contemporaneous demand shock that raises GDP per capita and also 
results in the opening of new universities. We also control for a number of observables 𝑋𝑋, that may 
be related to GDP per capita growth and also the growth in universities; in particular the population 
of the region, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝. 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the error term. 
The cross sectional relationship is likely to be confounded by unobservable region-specific 
effects. To tackle this we estimate the model in long (five-year) differences to sweep out the fixed 
effects. Our main estimating model is therefore: 
(2) ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑌𝑌/𝐿𝐿)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼1∆ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−5 +𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−5′ 𝛼𝛼2 + 𝛼𝛼3 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑌𝑌/𝐿𝐿)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−5 + 𝛼𝛼4∆ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−5 +
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
We control for the lagged level of GDP per capita in the region; 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑌𝑌/𝐿𝐿)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−5 to allow for 
catch up (we expect 𝛼𝛼3 to be negative). In the controls we include the lagged level of population, 
country level GDP per capita and the region specific time invariant controls. We control for the 
lagged growth in population because an increase in universities may simply reflect a greater 
demand due to population growth. We do not initially include any other measure of human capital 
in these specifications, so that we can capture the total effect that universities have on growth. 
However, we explore the effect of adding human capital when we try to pin down the mechanism 
through which universities impact on growth. Finally, we include country fixed effects (𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖) to 
allow for country-specific time trends, time dummies (𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡) and an error term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡. Standard errors 
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are clustered at the regional level. In robustness tests, we also estimate models where we include 
a full regional dummies and so allow for unobservable regional trends. 
We also explore the extent to which GDP per capita growth in region i may be affected by 
growth of universities in other regions within the same country. We extend our estimating equation 
(2) to include the growth of universities in other regions, which may be the nearest region (j) or 
simply all other regions in the country (-i). Therefore, we include the growth in region i’s own 
universities (∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−5) as well as a potential spillover effect from universities located in in 
neighboring regions (∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−5), see equation (3). The lagged population level and population 
growth in region j are in the controls, 𝑋𝑋′𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−5. 
(3) ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝑌𝑌/𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� = 𝜃𝜃1∆ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝑈𝑈𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−5� + 𝜃𝜃2∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝑈𝑈𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−5� + 𝑋𝑋′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−5𝜃𝜃3 + 𝑋𝑋′𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−5𝜃𝜃4 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 +
𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
We allow for spatial variation by interacting university growth with the distance between 
region i and its nearest region, and control for this distance separately, see equation (4). The 
variable 𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗  is the distance in kilometers between the centroids of regions i and j.  
(4) ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝑌𝑌/𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� = 𝜙𝜙1∆ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−5 +𝜙𝜙2∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−5 + 𝜙𝜙3𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗 ∗ ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−5 + 𝜙𝜙4𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗 +
𝑋𝑋′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−5𝜙𝜙5 + 𝑋𝑋′𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−5𝜙𝜙6 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
In the limit, if the nearest region were very close to region i, so that 𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗 = 0, we would 
expect that the effect of university growth in region j to be close to the effect of university growth 
in region i, so 𝜙𝜙2  should be close to 𝜙𝜙1 . More generally, we would expect that 𝜙𝜙3  would be 
negative so that the effect of region j gets smaller as distance increases. 
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Table 3 presents our basic regressions. Column (1) is a simple correlation between the 
lagged growth rate of universities an regional GDP per capita, with no other controls. The 
estimated coefficient is 0.0469 and highly significant. To control for the fact that populous regions 
are more likely to require more universities, we add the lagged level of the population in column 
(2) which lowers the university coefficient slightly. Adding country and year fixed effects has little 
effect, and actually raises the university coefficeint slightly. In column (4) we add lagged regional 
GDP per capita, growth in population, and the regional covariates (latitude, inverse distance to the 
coast, malaria ecology, and the natural log of oil and gas production (1950-2010)) and a dummy 
for regions that contain a capital city. In column (5) we control for lagged country-level GDP per 
capita which should capture time varying macro shocks, with little effect. Columns (6) and (7) 
replicate (4) and (5) but include regional fixed effects, a very demanding specification which 
allows for regional trends. These do not much affect the university coefficient and in fact it is 
higher at 0.0468 in the most general specification. Overall, these results suggest that on average, a 
doubling of universities in a region is associated with 4% to 5% higher GDP per person.14  
We include lagged regional GDP as this is standard in growth regressions to capture 
convergence, and because in this application, it is relevant to know that our university effect 
survives holding initial conditions of a region constant. There are of course issues of bias when 
controlling for a lagged dependent variable, particularly in fixed effects regressions with a short 
time dimension15, but this does not appear to be an issue here for our coefficient of interest. The 
14 Our analysis is carried out on a sample that drops 54 observations from China pre 1970, before and during the 
Cultural Revolution, when universities were shut down. Our effects survive if these observations are included, with 
the coefficient on university growth becoming 0.0308, still significant at the 1% level. We drop them because of the 
unique nature of this historical episode and the fact that this small number of observations (less than 1% of the full 
sample) seem to have a large effect on the coefficient. 
15 See Hurwicz (1950) and Nickell (1981), and discussion in the context of growth regressions in Barro (2012). 
IV. RESULTS
IV.1 Basic Results
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university effect is not sensitive to its inclusion.16 Nevertheless, we emphasise the OLS estimates 
from column (5) in this paper, but show that the fixed effects specification in column (7) is also 
robust to a number of checks in the next section for completeness. 
The other variables in the regressions take the expected signs. The coefficient on the 
regional convergence term is nearly 2% in columns (4) and (5).17 Country GDP per capita has a 
negative coefficient in these specifications. This becomes a positive relationship once regional 
fixed effects are included. Having a capital city in a region is associated with around one 
percentage point higher regional GDP per capita growth. The geographic controls generally have 
the expected signs (see Table A1 in the Appendix). We explore different distributed lag structures, 
but find that a single five year lag is a reasonable summary of the data (Table A2).18 This is likely 
to be due to the fact that in longer time frames, there are more factors at play which are not captured 
in our estimation framework. 
IV.2 Robustness  
Specification and sample checks 
In Table 4, we show that our regressions are robust to a series of checks. This is the case 
for both the OLS and fixed effects regressions from columns (5) and (7) to Table 3 which are 
replicated in row (1). In row (2) we conservatively cluster standard errors at the country level, to 
account for correlation between the errors of regions within the same country over time. While the 
16 The coefficients on lagged university growth if we run specifications (5) and (7) excluding lagged regional GDP 
per capita are 0.042 in both cases, still significant at the one per cent level. 
17 In the fixed effects specifications (7) and (8) this is larger, reflecting the downward (Hurwicz) bias in the coefficient 
of the lagged dependent variable which is particularly an issue in short panels (see Barro (2012) and Gennaioli et al. 
(2014)).  
18 There is some evidence that contemporaneous and 10 year lagged university growth has a positive significant effect 
in more advanced economies, but these results are not systematic. Interestingly, the contemporaneous (unlagged) 
effect of university growth is zero or negative (though not particularly significant), suggesting that it takes some time 
for benefits to be felt, while presumably some costs are incurred at the regional level.  
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standard errors rise a little, the association between lagged university growth and GDP per capita 
growth remains significant at the 1% level.19 In row (3) we weight the regression by the region’s 
population as a share of total country population, in case low density regions (which might be 
outliers) are affecting the results. Again, this weighting has little effect on the university coefficient. 
In row (4) we include country-year dummies instead of lagged country-level GDP per capita, to 
control for time varying factors at the country level (including national income) that may affect 
both university growth and GDP per capita growth (for example a general increase in funding for 
higher education, or a change in national government). This does reduce the coefficient, but it is 
still highly significant. In row (5) we control for the current (as well as lagged) change in 
population to address the concern that the effect of the university is simply to pull in more people 
to the region, who spend or produce more and hence raise GDP per capita growth. Our university 
effect remains strong and therefore it does not appear to be driven by population growth. Row (6) 
uses growth in university density (universities per million people) instead of university count, with 
very similar results. We prefer to use the university count in our core analysis, with controls for 
population growth, as changes in university density can be driven either by the numerator 
(universities) or the denominator (population) and can be more difficult to interpret. 
We then perform a few checks to see whether regions with no universities, or regions 
getting their first university are driving the results. Row (7) of Table 4 drops regions which never 
have a university in the sample period, and row (8) drops region-years with zero universities, and 
19 We also estimate these regressions using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors (results available on request) to allow for 
cross-sectional dependence in a panel. The results are still highly significant (at the 1 per cent level) and given that 
such methods are not intended for panels with small T and large N (our core sample has T=13 and N=1,498) we prefer 
to stick with region-level clusters in our core specifications. We note that our results are robust also to clustering at 
the country level which is a more conservative specification as it allows the standard errors in one region-year to be 
correlated with standard errors in any other region-year within the same country.  
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the coefficients remains unchanged.  To make sure our results are not driven by extreme university 
growth observations we do two things. Row (9) drops region-year observations where a region 
opens its first university, and in row (10) we winsorize the top and bottom five per cent of 
university growth which both strengthen the results.20 Row (11) uses similarly winsorized GDP 
per capita growth as the dependent variable, which dampens reduces our coefficient slightly but it 
still significant at the 1% level. In row (12) we show that the results are not sensitive to dropping 
observations where we have interpolated GDP per capita. To address measurement problems in 
terms of missing founding dates, in row (13) we include a dummy for regions where more than 
five percent of the universities have missing founding dates, reflecting the fact that university 
counts in those regions will be worse measured compared to elsewhere, this has little effect (and 
clearly is meaningless in the second column as the dummy is subsumed into regional fixed effects). 
Finally, we explore whether the definition of university in WHED (i.e. only institutions that offer 
four year courses or postgraduate degrees) may be a problem, in the sense that there may be some 
countries that have a larger share of institutions outside this category which could be important for 
growth. For this purpose, we compare the most recent university numbers in our database to an 
external source, Webometrics.21 Row (14) shows that our results are robust to dropping the 29 
countries where there are more than double the number of institutions in Webometrics compared 
to the WHED listing. 
We have shown that both specifications are similarly robust. Given potential issues with 
fixed effects estimation with a lagged dependent variable previously discussed, and in the interests 
20 In further robustness checks (available on request) we also explore if there are any heterogeneous effects for regions 
opening their first universities by interacting the dummy with the university growth variable. The coefficients on both 
the dummy and interaction term are not significantly different from zero.  
21 http://www.webometrics.info/en/node/54 
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of parsimony, we focus on the OLS specifications (Table 3, column (5)) in the remainder of the 
paper. Some further robustness tests are reported in the online Appendix. To investigate the 
potential concern that our results are driven by expectations of growth in the region we explore 
“Granger Causality” tests. We use the growth in universities as the dependent variable and regress 
this on the lagged growth in regional GDP per capita, and the other controls (Table A3). We see 
that even as all controls are added, the lagged growth of regional GDP per capita has no 
relationship with current growth in unviersities and does not appear to “Granger cause” the 
opening up of univeristies. We also show that the university effect exists across continents (Table 
A4).22 Finally, we find that lagged university levels have positive significant effects on growth in 
“Barro-style” regressions (see Tables A5 and A6, and discussion in the online Appendix).  
Heterogeneity between universities 
A concern with our econometric strategy is that our use of university numbers is an 
imperfect measure of university presence. Universities are not homogeneous, but vary in size and 
quality. Clearly, both of these dimensions are likely to matter in terms of economic impact 
(although it is not obvious why this would necessarily generate any upwards bias in our estimates). 
Using the crude count of universities may not be useful if the distribution of university size 
is uneven across regions. It is reasonable to expect that larger universities will have a larger 
economic impact; and thus size may be a better measure of university presence. For our university 
counts to be an adequate measure of university presence, we would want them to be positively 
22 We split the sample into Europe and North America, Latin America Asia (including Australia) and Africa. In further 
analysis, available on request, we examine more detailed splits of the data. Looking at North America alone, the 
coefficient seems low – we find that the effects are stronger for the US than Canada, and also dampened by low density 
regions. Weighting the regression by population, the coefficient for the US rises to 0.115, and becomes significant at 
the 5 per cent level. Further investigation of Europe reveals that the coefficient for the UK, France and West Germany 
is 0.0395 and signficant at the 5 per cent level, but that this is diluted by the rest of Europe (in particular Eastern 
Europe and Scandinavia) when all countries are aggregated. We also find that the significant effects observed in Latin 
America and Asia are not driven by any one particular country. 
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correlated with total enrolments at the region level, and also with their growth rates. If, for example, 
some regions had a multitude of small universities and others had only a handful of large ones, we 
would not be comparing like for like.  Ideally we would want to be able to run our regressions 
using changes in enrolments over time. Unfortunately, an international time series of regional 
enrolments is not available, but we focus on the United States where state level enrolments dating 
from 1970 are published by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).23 We find that 
university numbers and total enrolments are highly correlated (around 0.9 for any year over the 
period 1970-2010) that there is a strong positive relationship between the growth in universities 
and growth in students between 1970-2010 (see Figure A4 in the online Appendix). This gives us 
some reassurance that the number of universities is a reasonable measure of university presence at 
the state level. We also include growth in enrolments in our growth regressions (results available 
on request), finding that the coefficient on enrolment growth is positive and of the same order of 
magnitude as our main university effect. 24  These correlations and regressions give us some 
comfort that the use of university numbers to reflect university presence is reasonable. Moreover, 
we consider that the number of universities is a better “supply side” measure of university presence 
in the sense that enrolments are more likely to reflect endogenous demand from students over time. 
Another potential weakness in using the number of universities as our measure of 
university presence is that universities differ in their quality. Ideally, to measure quality we would 
like to have global rankings for all our institutions, carried out annually throughout our sample 
period. However, university rankings tables only tend to cover the top few hundred institutions in 
23 See http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=98. 
24 The effect of enrolments is positive but insignificant. This analysis is carried out on the 1970-2010 subsample of 
data, for which even our main university effect loses significance in the US.  
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the world, and tend to be available for recent years (for example the Shanghai Rankings have been 
compiled since 2003 and cover the world’s top 500 universities).  
Our data do contain some key attributes of universities which may be indicative of quality, 
specifically whether a university is a research institution which is more likely to have effects on 
innovation (we take whether or not a university is PhD granting as an indicator of research 
activity), whether it is public or private, whether it offers science, technology, engineering or 
mathematics (STEM) subjects, and whether it offers professional service related courses (business, 
economics, law, accounting, finance).  We add these variables to the analysis by considering the 
effect of the growth in the share of each type of university over and above the growth in the number 
of all universities.25 
Table 5 examines whether these various proxies for university quality have differential 
effects on GDP growth. Here, we drop region-year observations with zero universities (where the 
share would be meaningless). Panel A shows the result for the full sample of countries. Each 
column includes one of these measures in turn. The effects are not significantly different from 
zero, suggesting that on the entire sample there seems to be a general university effect which does 
not vary much by type of university as defined here. We also perform this quality analysis on the 
more advanced economies of Western Europe and the US. In Panel B we can see that now increases 
in the share of PhD granting institutions are significant though the other measures are not, 
suggesting that the research channel may be more important in countries at the technology 
“frontier” (Aghion et al., 2005). Growth in the shares of public, STEM subject and professional 
subject universities all have no additional impact on growth, though this may be due to 
25 We note that these characteristics apply to the universities’ status in 2010. In the absence of a full time series of 
when universities begin to offer different courses or qualifications, we simply assume that these characteristics apply 
since the universities were founded. 
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measurement issues.26 Equivalent analysis of the sample of all other countries (Panel C) shows no 
effect for any of the quality measures. 
Summary on robustness 
We have shown that our results are robust to different specification and, to the extent that 
the data allow, consideration of the size and quality dimensions. However, this framework does 
not allow us to address potential endogeneity due to time-varying unobservables. It could be that 
our results are driven by factors that vary at the region – year level. For example, it could be that 
some regions have good local governments in certain time periods who implement a number of 
policies that are growth enhancing, one of which happens to be opening up universities. Although 
there is no direct way to address this without an external instrument, the fact that such policy 
decisions would take a while to feed through to the building of a university and the growth effects 
of universities are themselves felt only several years in the future, makes us doubt that such local 
political shocks are the reason for the relationships we observe in our data. 
IV.3 Geographical Spillover effects of universities 
If the effects we are finding are real we would expect to see that universities do not just 
affect the region in which they are located, but also neighboring regions. Therefore, in addition to 
including own region university growth we include university growth in other regions in the same 
country to see whether this affect GDP per capita in our home region. Table 6 presents the results 
of this spillover analysis. Column (1) replicates our baseline result. Column (2) includes lagged 
university growth in the nearest region. This shows that universities in the nearest region have a 
26 The way we ascertain subjects offered by each university is by extracting key relevant words from the information 
provided in WHED. For some universities the descriptions offered can be quite broad (e.g. it may specify “social 
sciences” instead of listing out individual subjects). We try to keep our STEM and professional course categories 
broad to account for this, but there are likely to be cases where we do not pick up the accurate subject mix at a 
university. 
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positive but insignificant effect on home region growth. However, on closer inspection it appears 
that some “nearest regions” are actually very distant, and are dampening this result. In column (3) 
we drop observations where the nearest region is over 200km away (which constitute a fifth of all 
regions in the sample). In this column the nearest regions have an effect of nearly the same 
magnitude as the home region, though with larger standard errors. Therefore, using the full sample 
again in column (4), we control for the growth in universities in the nearest region interacted with 
the distance to that region (based on distance between centroids), and a linear term in distance. 
Consistent with column (3), the interaction is negative and significant and the linear “neighbouring 
universities” term is positive and significant. In column (5) we add the relevant controls for the 
neighbouring region – the lagged population and population growth (which should also control for 
a demand shock in the neighbouring region in the previous period). These have little effect on our 
coefficients or their significance. The magnitude of the effects is sensible: universities in a 
neighbour that has a distance of near zero has essentially the same effect on growth as a university 
in the region of interest (0.0430 vs. 0.0356). 
Finally, we look at the effects of university growth in all other regions (including nearest 
region) in the country on our home region. Column (6) adds the lagged growth in universities in 
all regions of a country, excluding the home region. Column (7) also adds the relevant controls 
(lagged population and population growth for the other regions). These effects are now larger than 
our main effect and again highly significant.27 The implication is that a doubling of universities in 
the rest of the country (which in most cases will represent a greater absolute increase than a 
doubling of home region universities) will on average increase home region’s GDP per capita by 
27 Standard errors in this analysis are clustered at the region level. Conservatively clustering at the country level does 
not affect the significance of the nearest region analysis at all. The coefficients on growth in all other regions (columns 
(6) and (7))  remain significant at the 10% level. 
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nearly 6 per cent. Overall, this analysis suggests that universities not only affect the region in which 
they are built, but also their neighbours and that there does appear to be a spatial dimension to this, 
in the sense that the closer regions are geographically, the stronger the effects. This suggests that 
from a country perspective, universities generate local and macro growth. Therefore, the full effect 
of opening universities on a country must be greater than what we find in our core regressions.  
IV.4 Magnitudes 
Using the coefficients in Table 6 we can estimate a country-wide effect of a university 
expansion on the typical region in our dataset. The average region has nearly 10 universities (see 
Table 2), and the average country has 20 regions (and therefore 200 universities). Doubling the 
universities in one region (10 to 20) implies a 4% uplift to its GDP per capita according to our 
main result. For each other region, this represents a 5.3% increase in universities in the rest of the 
country (a rise from 190 universities to 200), multiplied by 6% (the coefficient on other regions in 
column (7)), this implies an uplift to all other regions’ GDP per capita of 0.3%. Assuming the 
regions in this hypothetical country are identical, the uplift to country-wide GDP per capita is 
simply the average of these effects: 0.5%.28  
While this seems like a significant amount of benefit, we also need to consider the costs of 
university expansion.29 Given that the costs of building and maintaining universities will vary 
widely by country, we choose to focus on a particular institutional setting for this calculation. In 
28 As a sense check for this result, we collapse our regional dataset to the country level and run macro regressions of 
GDP per capita growth on lagged university growth. The coefficient on university growth is 0.03 (but insignificant). 
According to these results, an 100% increase in universities at the country level would be associated with a 3% increase 
in GDP per capita growth. Therefore a 6% increase in universities would imply a 0.2% uplift – this is smaller than the 
0.5% we calculate using the results from our better identified regional analysis, but of the same order of magnitude. 
29 It is unlikely that these are controlled for in our regressions: a large portion of university financing tends to be at the 
national level, and costs are incurred on an ongoing basis (e.g. property rental or amortisation and staff salaries are 
incurred every year) and so would not be fully captured by the inclusion of lagged country GDP per capita as a 
covariate. 
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the UK in 2010, there were 171 universities across its 10 regions. As an experiment we add one 
university to each region, a total increase of 10 universities (6%) at the country level. Using similar 
steps as in our hypothetical country above (but taking into account the actual numbers of 
universities in each UK region in 2010), we calculate that the overall increase to GDP per capita 
(or GDP, assuming population is held constant) is 0.7%.30 Applied to UK GDP in 2010 (£1,614 
billion according to the ONS 31) this comes to an additional £11.3 billion per year. A crude 
approximation of the annual costs associated with a university can be made based on university 
finance data: in 2009-2010 the average expenditure per institution in the UK was around £160 
million.32 Multiplying this by the 10 universities in our experiment, the implied annual cost for the 
additional universities is £1.6bn, or 0.1% of GDP. So, in this example the benefits of university 
expansion are five times as large as the costs (0.5% vs. 0.1%). 
While this calculation is highly simplified, it shows that there is a large margin between 
the potential benefits of university expansion implied by our regression results and likely costs. 
We note that the costs of setting up universities, and methods of university finance vary by country 
so we cannot generalize this result to other countries, nor make statements about the optimal 
30 For each of the ten regions in the UK in turn, we calculate the percentage increase implied by adding one university 
to that region’s universities, and multiply this by the 4% (effect of a 100% increase). We then calculate the increase 
in the count of universities in all other regions (for that region), and raise their GDP per capita by that percentage 
increase multiplied by 6% (the effect of 100% growth of universities in “other regions” on home region GDP per 
capita from Table 6). We abstract from the 5 year lag in this calculation. We the add up the total GDP across regions, 
and divide by total population (assumed unchanged). 
31 Series ABMI, Gross Domestic Product: chained volume measures: Seasonally adjusted £m, Base period 2012 
32 Data on university finance, by institution, can be found at the UK Higher Education Statistical Authority (HESA) 
website (https://www.hesa.ac.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1900&Itemid=634). Total 
expenditure in the year 2009/10 was nearly £26 billion across 164 institutions listed in HESA, implying around £160 
million per institution. University expenditure contains staff costs, other operating expenses, depreciation, interest and 
other finance costs. We checked if this figure has been relatively stable over time, finding that by 2013-14, average 
expenditure was £180 million. At this higher amount, the implied costs of our expansion rise to 0.11% of GDP. Note 
that the number of institutions present in 2010 was 173. The majority of institutions in WHED (156) correspond to 
those listed in HESA, but there are a small number of discrepancies due to differences in the classifications of some 
institutes or colleges between the two listings. This does not matter for our purposes, as are simply using the HESA 
data to calculate the average expenditure of a typical university. 
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number of universities in particular regions. Similar calculations for other countries could be made 
by delving into particular institutional settings. 
V. Mechanisms 
Having established a robust association of universities on GDP per capita we now turn to 
trying to understand the mechanisms through which universities may affect growth.  
V.1 Human Capital 
We add measures of growth in human capital to our regressions to see how this influences 
the university coefficient. In Table 7 we consider the relationship between universities and college 
share. Column (1) replicates the core result, and column (2) the same specfication on the reduced 
sample where college share is non-missing, for which the university effect is a bit stronger at 0.07. 
Column (3) adds the lagged growth in college share which in itself is highly significant, and 
reduces the university effect from 0.0710 to 0.0672. Column (4) uses contemporaneous growth in 
college share and column (5) adds in the lagged college share. In column (6) we include also the 
level with both lags, with little change in the university coefficient. In column (7) we look at the 
raw correlation between contemporaneous growth and the lagged growth in universities (with only 
country fixed effects as controls), and find it to be relatively small but highly significant. Adding 
all the other controls dampens this relationship further and this small effect of university growth 
on college share is what explains the fact that adding in growth in human capital causes only a 
small reduction in the coefficient on universities. This analysis suggests that a 1% rise in the 
number of universities gives rise to around a 0.4 percentage point rise in the college share.33 
33 Table A7 in the Appendix uses another measure of human capital: years of education, which is available for a larger 
sample of countries and years. The qualitative results are similar  
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Appendix A2.2 gives some simple simulations showing that the magnitude of effect of universities 
on human capital magnitude is unsurprising giving the variation we are using in the data. 
V.2 Innovation 
The best available measure of innovation output available consistently at the regional level 
over time is patents, though unfortunately patents with locational information are not available for 
our entire sample of countries and years. We consider the effects of adding growth in cumulative 
patent “stocks” 34 to our regressions, first for the US (where we use US PTO registered patents 
over the period 1965-1999), and then internationally (we use patents filed at the European Patent 
Office which are available for over 38 of our countries between 1975 and 2005). Table 8, Panel A 
shows the results for the US. Column (1) runs the core regression for the US only, and over the 
time period that we have patents data.35 Column (2) then includes the change in patents stock, 
which reduces the coefficient on university growth from 0.113 to 0.109 (a reduction of four per 
cent). Patents themselves have a positive association with GDP per capita growth, but this is not 
significant. Column (3) considers the raw correlation between lagged university growth and 
current patent stock growth (including only year dummies), and shows it is positive and significant 
at the one per cent level. Column (4) then adds the standard controls, and this correlation becomes 
substantially smaller and insignificant.  
This analysis suggests that at least for the US, innovation is part of the story of why 
universities have an economic impact, though not the entire story. This may be because the effect 
of newer universities on patents takes a while to accumulate. 
34 Patent stocks are simply the cumulative patents registered at the region level, and it is assumed that this is not 
depreciated. Results are not sensitive to alternative depreciation assumptions. 
35 This regression is weighted by population since we found that the effects of low density outliers were dampening 
the effects in the US. 
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On a wider sample of countries, we also consider EPO patents (Panel B). Column (1) 
restricts the regression to the sample for which we have the EPO patents data giving us a university 
effect of 0.0220, signficant at the 10 per cent level. Adding in patents in column (2) reduces the 
effect of universities by around 13 per cent, and we see that growth in patents has a strong 
association with regional GDP growth in this international sample. A doubling of the patent stock 
is associated with 5% higher per capita GDP. Columns (4) and (5) shows the raw correlation 
between lagged university growth and patents growth, and shows that it is postitive, but 
insignificant.  
V.3 Institutions and democracy 
The use of country fixed effects throughout our analysis should rule out the possibilty that 
the effects of universities simply reflect different (time invariant) institutions, since these things 
tend to differ mainly at the country level. We also show that the results survive the inclusion of 
country-year fixed effects in the robustness, this would capture country specific changes in 
institutions or changes in government. To the extent that time invariant institutions vary within 
countries, say at the US state level, our regional fixed effects analysis should address this.  
However, institutions do vary over time, and it is possible that universities contribute to 
this – albeit over longer time horizons than those analysed in our core regressions. We saw in 
Figure 5 that there is a positive significant correlation between country level democratic 
institutions (as proxied by Polity scores) and universities. This correlation also exists when we 
consider the 1960-2000 change in universities and polity scores (see the online Appendix for more 
discussion). A time series of data on regional institutions to fit into our growth framework is not 
available, but we do explore the relationships between perceptions of democracy obtained from 
the World Values Survey and lagged university presence in the cross section.  
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Our chosen survey measure is a categorical variable which gives the approval of a democratic 
system for governing one’s own country, as this is more widely available across survey waves 
compared with other questions on democracy.36 We note however, that the experience in one’s 
own country (for example, if corruption prevents democracy operating effectively) may affect this 
judgement. Therefore, in the robustness we test whether results hold for a another more general 
survey question37 (available for fewer survey waves). World Values Survey data begins in the 
1980s and we pool data into a cross section due to insufficient observations in some region–year 
cells to generate reliable variation over time.  
Table 9 shows the results of these regressions.38 We start with a simple correlation between 
our measure of university density lagged by 15 years from the survey year, controlling for country 
and year fixed effects and clustering standard errors at the region level (column (1)).39 This shows 
a highly signficant association between university presence in a region and approval of a 
democratic system. The relationship is robust to including a host of individual demographic 
characteristics such as gender, age, martial status, children, employment and relative incomes 
(column (2)). In column (3) we see that the result is also robust to including controls for the 
individual’s own education: a dummy for whether or not they hold a university degree, and a 
36 Specifically, the question asks respondents to say whether having a democratic political system is a (1) very good, 
(2) fairly good, (3) fairly bad, (4) bad way of governing their country. The scale is reversed for our estimation so that 
a higher score reflects higher approval.  
37 This question asks respondents if they (1) agree strongly, (2) agree, (3) disagree or (4) strongly disagree whit this 
statement “Democracy may have problems but is better than any other form of government”. Again, the scale is 
reversed for our estimation so that a higher score reflects higher approval.  
38 This analysis is carried out on 58 of the 78 countries in our core sample, where World Values Survey data are 
available. World Values Survey data are available for Nigeria which is in our core sample, but it was not possible to 
map the regions to the regions used in WHED due to the fact that both sources used very aggregated but different 
regions. 
39 We explored different lag structures, and found that it takes time for universities to affect perceptions (see column 
(3) in Table D1 which shows a smaller positive, but insignificant effect of five year lagged university density on 
democratic approval). By contrast, on the full sample of countries there appear to be no effects for longer lags. When 
we consider the sub-sample of OECD countries where the results are stronger we see that the effects are similar in 
magnitude and significance for the 30 year lag. 
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dummy indicating whether or not they are a student. The result that one’s own education is 
positively related to approval of democracy is consistent with Chong and Gradstein (2009) who 
use years of schooling. But the result that universities matter over and above their effect on an 
individual’s education suggests that they may be a mechanism whereby democratic ideals spill 
over from those who have direct contact with universities, or that there is some form of direct 
diffusion from universities into their surrounding region. Further supporting this, we find that the 
result survives dropping students and graduates from the regression entirely (see Table A9 more 
robustness tests and further discussion in the online Appendix). Column (4) adds our standard 
geographic controls and shows that these do not affect our result. This analysis shows that there is 
robust relationship between other lag lengths of university presence in a region and approval of a 
democratic system, and that this operates over and above the human capital effect. While it is not 
possible to account for any potential impact of this type of mechanism on growth in our current 
framework, this analysis suggests that institutions could be part of the story, albeit on a longer term 
basis. 
V.4 Demand effects 
Could our results simply be driven by a mechanical impact of universities on regional 
GDP? Students and staff in a university consume more goods and services. Including changes in 
population in our regressions (lagged, and contemporaneous in the robustness tests) should have 
largely controlled for the possibility that universities simply contribute to growth through a 
mechanical demand channel associated with people coming into the region and consuming more. 
Moreover, showing that our university coefficient remains robust to including changes in current 
and lagged human capital (see Table 7) should also address the concern that the effects are simply 
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driven by higher earners entering the region (changes in college share will reflect inward migration 
of graduates, in addition to the impact of universities churning out graduates). 
To the extent that university finance comes from inside the same region, there should be 
no mechanical demand effect as this should already be netted off. For example, in the US, states 
have historically provided more assistance to tertiary institutions and students: 65 per cent more 
on average over the period 1987 to 2012, though now the share is more equal.40 But if university 
finance comes from outside the region (e.g. from the Federal government), this could also result 
in higher GDP per capita as the university purchases goods and services within the region 
(including paying salaries to staff and support services).  
We think it unlikely that the regressions are merely capturing this type of effect. The initial 
shock to region GDP associated with the new university is likely to occur in the year it is founded 
(when transfers begin, and include capital and set up costs), and the level effect should be captured 
by lagged regional GDP which we control for in the regressions. Ongoing transfers may rise 
incrementally over the years as the university increases its size and scope, but we might expect the 
largest effect on growth would be in the initial years rather than in the subsequent five year period. 
Notwithstanding this argument, we carry out a simple calculation to show that even under 
very generous assumptions, direct effects are unlikely to explain a large portion of our results. We 
use the hypothetical experiment of a new university of 8,500 students and 850 staff opening in the 
average region of our dataset (see Appendix A2.2). We estimate the effects of the transfer into the 
40 This difference has narrowed in recent years as state spending declined since the financial crisis, and federal 
investments grew sharply. Today the total expenditure is similar, though spending categories differ: state funding 
focuses more on general running expenditure and federal funding on research and student grants. For detail, see an 
analysis of federal and state funding of higher education in the US by Pew Charitable Trusts, 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2015/06/federal-and-state-funding-of-higher-
education 
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region assuming that all the costs of our new university are met from sources outside the region, 
and that these are spent within the region. We assume that the average cost per student is $10,000, 
and therefore the cost for a university of 8,500 students is $85 million. With a university of constant 
size, building up year-group enrolments over four years, there would be no effect in the following 
five year period. If we assume total enrolments grow by 5%, we can explain around 15% of the 
regression coefficient on universities.  
V.5 Summary on mechanisms 
In summary, it appears some of the effects of university growth on GDP growth work via 
human capital and innovation channels, though the effects of these are small in magnitude. In 
addition, universities may affect views on democracy but this appears to be on a longer term basis. 
We have shown convincingly that the university effect is not merely driven by mechanical demand 
effects.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a new dataset on universities in over 1,500 regions in 78 countries since
1950. We have found robust evidence that increases in university presence are positively 
associated with faster subsequent economic growth. Doubling the number of universities is 
associated with over 4% higher GDP per capita in a region. This is even after controlling for 
regional fixed effects, regional trends and a host of other confounding influences. The benefit of 
universities is not confined to the region where they are built but “spills over” to neighboring 
regions, having the strongest effects on those that are geographically closest. Using these results, 
we estimate that the economic benefits of university expansion are likely to exceed their costs. 
Our estimates use within country time series variation and imply smaller effects of 
universities on GDP than would be suggested from cross sectional relationships. But we believe 
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our effects are likely to be lower bounds as the long-run effect of universities through building the 
stock of human and intellectual capital may be hard to fully tease out using the panel data available 
to us. Nevertheless, the evidence seems compelling here that there is some effect of universities 
on growth.  
Understanding the mechanisms through which the university effects works is an important 
area to investigate further. We find a role for innovation and human capital supply (but not demand 
or transfers into a region), although these are small in magnitude. This might be due to statistical 
issues, but better data on the flow of business-university linkages, movements of personnel and 
other collaborations would help in unravelling the underlying mechanisms. In addition, focusing 
on the relationships between universities and local economic performance in individual countries 
where better causal designs and richer university data is available would be a valuable extension 
(e.g. Jäger, 2013).  
We provide suggestive evidence that universities play a role in promoting democracy, and 
that this operates over and above their effect as human capital producers. Understanding the extent 
to which this may account for part of the growth effect is another area for future research. 
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Table 1: CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSIONS 
Dependent variable:  
Regional GDP per capita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
ln(1 + # universities) 0.680*** 0.214*** 0.160*** 0.0555*** 0.159*** 0.0788*** 0.0565*** 
(0.124) (0.0422) (0.0388) (0.0206) (0.0444) (0.0255) (0.0202) 
ln(population) -0.468*** -0.105** -0.112*** -0.0692*** -0.0948** -0.0582** -0.0949*** 
(0.0998) (0.0412) (0.0325) (0.0233) (0.0350) (0.0225) (0.0277) 
Years of Education 0.292*** 0.287*** 0.262*** 
(0.0280) (0.0345) (0.0395) 
ln(1 + EPO Patent "stock") 0.0524*** 
(0.0124) 
Observations 1213 1213 1182 1182 658 658 658 
Adjusted R-squared 0.247 0.890 0.904 0.932 0.916 0.947 0.951 
# clusters 65 65 62 62 34 34 34 
country dummies no yes yes yes yes yes yes 
region controls no no yes yes yes yes yes 
Notes: OLS estimates based on data in 2000. Standard errors clustered at the country level. Column (1) shows the relationship between universities and GDP per capita, controlling for population. 
Column (2) includes country dummies. Column (3) includes regional controls (a dummy indicating whether the region contains a capital city, together with latitude, inverse distance to ocean, 
malaria ecology, log(oil and gas production) 1950-2010, these are not reported here). Column (4) includes years of education. Column (5) is identical to column (4) but restricts the sample to the 
regions for which OECD REGPAT patents are available. Column (6) includes years of education, and column (7) includes the natural log of the regional patent “stock”.
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Table 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, GROWTH ANALYSIS 
  Mean S.D Min p50 Max Obs 
Regional GDP per capita 13,055.75 11,958.30 262.15 8,463.02 105,648.25 8,128 
Growth in regional GDP per capita 0.02 0.03 -0.20 0.02 0.30 8,128 
Country GDP per capita 14,094.16 11,525.30 690.66 9,157.66 64,198.29 8,128 
# universities 9.60 23.71 0 2.00 461.00 8,128 
Growth in # universities 0.02 0.03 0 0 0.28 8,128 
Population (millions) 2.78 7.97 0.01 1.01 196.00 8,128 
Growth in population 0.01 0.02 -0.14 0.01 0.25 8,128 
Latitude 27.74 25.65 -54.33 37.75 69.95 8,128 
Inverse distance to ocean 0.03 0.07 0 0.01 1.89 8,128 
Malaria index 0.89 2.31 0 0.01 25.51 8,128 
log(oil and gas production) 1950-
2010 1.72 2.86 0 0 12.05 8,128 
Dummy for capital in region 0.05 0.22 0 0 1.00 8,128 
College share 0.07 0.07 0 0.04 0.45 5,744 
Years of education 7.37 3.08 0.39 7.42 13.76 6,640 
Notes: Each observation is region-year. Source: WHED and Gennaioli et al. (2014) for regional economic data. 
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Table 3: GROWTH ON LAGGED GROWTH REGRESSIONS 
Dependent variable:  
Regional Growth of GDP per capita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Lagged growth in #universities 0.0469*** 0.0363*** 0.0400*** 0.0457*** 0.0445*** 0.0447*** 0.0468*** 
(0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0112) (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0107) (0.0107) 
Lagged level of regional GDP per capita -0.0153*** -0.0127*** -0.0581*** -0.0776*** 
(0.00125) (0.00131) (0.00325) (0.00478) 
Lagged level of country GDP per capita -0.0213*** 0.0378*** 
(0.00422) (0.00611) 
Lagged level of population /100 0.178*** -0.0301 -0.0765* -0.0855** -1.095*** -0.850** 
(0.0324) (0.0351) (0.0395) (0.0387) (0.333) (0.352) 
Lagged growth in population -0.0987** -0.113*** -0.209*** -0.183*** 
(0.0383) (0.0385) (0.0446) (0.0452) 
Dummy for capital in region 0.0125*** 0.0110*** 
(0.00170) (0.00168) 
Observations 8128 8128 8128 8128 8128 8128 8128 
Adjusted R-squared 0.003 0.008 0.215 0.253 0.260 0.221 0.239 
# clusters 1498 1498 1498 1498 1498 1498 1498 
year dummies no no yes yes yes yes yes 
country dummies no no yes yes yes no no 
region controls no no no yes yes no no 
region dummies no no no no no yes yes 
Notes: OLS estimates, 78 countries. Column (1) is a simple correlation between regional GDP per capita growth and the lagged growth in university numbers. Column (2) controls for the lagged 
log of population. Column (3) includes country and year dummies. Column (4) controls for lagged regional GDP per capita, the lagged growth in population, the lagged log population density 
level, and lagged growth in average years of education, a dummy for whether the region contains a capital city, together with latitude, inverse distance to ocean, malaria ecology, log(oil and gas 
production) 1950-2010 (not reported here). Column (5) adds lagged country GDP per capita. Column (6) includes regional fixed effects, and the time varying controls of column (4). Column (7) 
adds lagged country GDP per capita. Standard errors are clustered at the regional level. Levels of GDP per capita and population are in natural logs. 
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Table 4:  ROBUSTNESS  
    Coefficient (s.e.), Lagged University Growth  
    
OLS,  
Region Controls 
Region  
Fixed Effects  N 
(1) Benchmark 0.0445*** 0.0468*** 8128 
    (0.0105) (0.0107)   
  A. Specification       
(2) Cluster at country level (78 clusters) 0.0445*** 0.0468*** 8128 
    (0.0138) (0.0162)   
(3) Population weights 0.0410*** 0.0427*** 8128 
    (0.0126) (0.0133)   
(4) Country-year fixed effects 0.0281*** 0.0227** 8128 
    (0.0103) (0.00992)   
(5) Control for current population change 0.0440*** 0.0452*** 8128 
    (0.0104) (0.0106)   
(6) University density instead of count 0.0304*** 0.0292*** 8128 
    (0.00904) (0.00865)   
  C. Sample issues       
(7) Drop regions that never have a university 0.0433*** 0.0473*** 6642 
    (0.0105) (0.0107)   
(8) Drop regions before they have a university 0.0425*** 0.0447*** 6041 
    (0.0108) (0.0109)   
(9) Drop first university observations 0.0508*** 0.0624*** 7897 
    (0.0133) (0.0142)   
(10) Winsorize university growth 0.0614*** 0.0644*** 8128 
    (0.0147) (0.0148)   
(11) Winsorize GDP per capita growth 0.0342*** 0.0356*** 8128 
    (0.00775) (0.00795)   
(12) Un-interpolated GDP per capita 0.0486*** 0.0469*** 5312 
    (0.0134) (0.0143)   
  D. Measurement issues      
(13) Dummy for > 5% missing founding dates 0.0421*** 0.0468*** 8128 
    (0.0106) (0.0107)   
(14) Country level total check (Webometrics) 0.0529*** 0.0579*** 5357 
    (0.0130) (0.0130)   
Notes: Row (1) replicates column (5) and column (7) from Table 3.
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Table 5: UNIVERSITY QUALITY MEASURES 
Dependent variable:  
Regional Growth of GDP per capita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Full sample 
Lagged growth in #universities 0.0512*** 0.0518*** 0.0497*** 0.0487*** 
(0.0136) (0.0135) (0.0141) (0.0136) 
Lagged growth in PhD share -0.00129 
(0.00479) 
Lagged growth in public share 0.00240 
(0.00444) 
Lagged growth in STEM share 0.00376 
(0.00339) 
Lagged growth in professional share 0.00492 
(0.00574) 
Observations 5612 5612 5612 5612 
Panel B: US and "Western Europe" 
Lagged growth in #universities 0.0296** 0.0315** 0.0378** 0.0341** 
(0.0140) (0.0141) (0.0150) (0.0151) 
Lagged growth in PhD share 0.0109** 
(0.00498) 
Lagged growth in public share 0.00477 
(0.00582) 
Lagged growth in STEM share -0.00280 
(0.00433) 
Lagged growth in professional share 
-
0.0000564 
(0.00451) 
Observations 1547 1547 1547 1547 
Panel C: All other countries 
Lagged growth in #universities 0.0557*** 0.0572*** 0.0547*** 0.0535*** 
(0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0163) (0.0158) 
Lagged growth in PhD share -0.00344 
(0.00622) 
Lagged growth in public share 0.00263 
(0.00552) 
Lagged growth in STEM share 0.00645 
(0.00447) 
Lagged growth in professional share 0.00661 
(0.00746) 
Observations 4065 4065 4065 4065 
Notes: Panel A includes the full sample of countries, and Panel B restricts to the US and “Western Europe” (defined as Austria, 
Belgium, Switzerland, West Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, UK, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden). Within 
each panel, Column (1) replicates our core regression (Column (5) from Table 3), but drops regions with zero universities. 
Columns (2) to (5) add in the lagged growth of the shares of universities of different types as labelled.
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Table 6:  UNIVERSITY SPILLOVERS FROM OTHER REGIONS 
Dependent variable:  
Regional Growth of GDP per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Lagged growth in #universities 0.0445*** 0.0426*** 0.0404*** 0.0431*** 0.0430*** 0.0354*** 0.0379*** 
  (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0116) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0105) 
Lagged growth in #universities, nearest 
region   0.0120 0.0270** 0.0355** 0.0356**     
    (0.0104) (0.0111) (0.0139) (0.0140)     
Lagged growth in #universities X distance to 
nearest region       -0.177** -0.180**     
        (0.0760) (0.0756)     
Distance to nearest region       0.00407** 0.00415**     
        (0.00205) (0.00205)     
Lagged growth in #universities in other 
regions within country           0.0556*** 0.0570*** 
            (0.0132) (0.0133) 
Observations 8128 8128 6544 8128 8128 8128 8128 
Adjusted R-squared 0.260 0.260 0.288 0.261 0.261 0.262 0.266 
# clusters 1498 1498 1257 1498 1498 1498 1498 
Nearest / other region controls no no no no yes no yes 
Notes: Column (1) replicates our core regression (column (5) from Table 3). Column (2) adds in the lagged growth in universities in the nearest region. Column (3) replicates column (2) but 
conditions the sample to regions whose nearest region is less than 200km away. Column (4) returns to the full sample, but adds an interaction term of universities with distance to that region (in 
km), and distance to that region as a separate variable.  Column (5) adds controls from the nearby region: namely the lagged population and population growth (not reported here). There were a 
small number of observations where the population in the nearest region was missing, relating to early years in the sample period. In this case, population was extrapolated back in time, using a 
log-linear trend, and a dummy variable included to indicate this. Column (6) includes the lagged growth in universities in all other regions of the country, and column (7) also adds the relevant 
controls from all other regions in the country: namely the lagged population and population growth (again with a dummy to indicate where the population in the rest of the country has been 
calculated with missing values for any regions that year).  
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Table 7:  UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGE SHARE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable Δ GDPpc Δ GDPpc Δ GDPpc Δ GDPpc Δ GDPpc Δ GDPpc Δ % college Δ % college 
Lagged growth in #universities 0.0445*** 0.0710*** 0.0672*** 0.0678*** 0.0653*** 0.0655*** 0.00545*** 0.00373*** 
  (0.0105) (0.0137) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.00118) (0.000984) 
Lagged growth in college share     1.963***   1.698*** 1.631***     
      (0.323)   (0.304) (0.327)     
Current growth in college share       0.870*** 0.651*** 0.663***     
        (0.146) (0.131) (0.128)     
Lagged level of college share           0.0102     
            (0.0181)     
Lagged level of regional GDP 
per capita -0.0127*** -0.00993*** -0.0112*** -0.0105*** -0.0114*** -0.0116***   0.000689*** 
  (0.00131) (0.00165) (0.00165) (0.00164) (0.00165) (0.00171)   (0.0000899) 
Lagged level of country GDP 
per capita -0.0213*** -0.0452*** -0.0431*** -0.0436*** -0.0421*** -0.0424***   -0.00190*** 
  (0.00422) (0.00439) (0.00434) (0.00437) (0.00433) (0.00444)   (0.000363) 
Lagged level of population/100 -0.0855** -0.169*** -0.191*** -0.178*** -0.195*** -0.198***   0.0110*** 
  (0.0387) (0.0466) (0.0471) (0.0463) (0.0471) (0.0480)   (0.00354) 
Lagged growth in population -0.113*** -0.0226 -0.0242 -0.0238 -0.0249 -0.0258   0.00137 
 (0.0385) (0.0491) (0.0495) (0.0493) (0.0496) (0.0497)   (0.00233) 
Dummy for capital in region 0.0110*** 0.00953*** 0.00791*** 0.00864*** 0.00746*** 0.00716***   0.00102*** 
  (0.00168) (0.00189) (0.00194) (0.00192) (0.00197) (0.00196)   (0.000204) 
Observations 8128 5118 5118 5118 5118 5118 5118 5118 
Adjusted R-squared 0.260 0.286 0.292 0.290 0.294 0.294 0.278 0.349 
# clusters 1498 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 
Notes: Growth in college share is simply the percentage point difference: (college share (t) – college share (t-5))/5. Column (1) replicates Column (5) from Table 3. Column (2) restricts to the 
sample for which the change in college share is available. Column (3) drops the lagged growth in college share. Column (4) adds the contemporaneous change in college share. Column (5) 
includes both lagged and contemporaneous changes. Column (6) further adds the lagged level of college share (unlogged). Column (7) regresses the change in college share on the lagged 
growth in universities, with country dummies, but no other controls. Column (8) adds all the other controls.  
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Table 8: UNIVERSITIES AND PATENTS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Δ GDPpc Δ GDPpc Δ patents Δ patents 
Panel A: USPTO  
Lagged growth in #universities 0.113* 0.109* 2.678*** 0.0801 
(0.0616) (0.0637) (0.657) (0.0653) 
Growth in USPTO patent "stock"   0.0430 
(0.0407) 
Lagged level of regional GDP per capita -0.0303*** -0.0292*** 
(0.00773) (0.00816) 
Lagged level of population/100 0.156* 0.165* -0.431*** 
(0.0883) (0.0862) (0.0864) 
Lagged growth in population -0.0888 -0.115* 0.510*** 
(0.0568) (0.0623) (0.0755) 
Dummy for capital in region -0.0142* -0.0133 -0.0113 
(0.00783) (0.00811) (0.0115) 
Observations 306 306 306 306 
Adjusted R-squared 0.350 0.349 0.049 0.994 
# clusters 51 51 51 51 
Panel B: EPO 
Lagged growth in #universities 0.0220* 0.0192 0.0531 0.0392 
(0.0122) (0.0117) (0.0457) (0.0457) 
Growth in EPO patent "stock"   0.0514*** 
(0.00528) 
Lagged level of regional GDP per capita -0.0127*** -0.0146*** 
(0.00234) (0.00241) 
Lagged level of country GDP per capita -0.000439 -0.00245 
(0.00653) (0.00609) 
Lagged level of population/100 -0.00830 -0.0930* 1.661*** 
(0.0541) (0.0547) (0.227) 
Lagged growth in population -0.137*** -0.111*** -0.451*** 
(0.0445) (0.0426) (0.145) 
Dummy for capital in region 0.0104*** 0.0104*** 0.0176* 
(0.00222) (0.00230) (0.00930) 
Observations 3747 3747 3747 3747 
Adjusted R-squared 0.320 0.342 0.306 0.343 
# clusters 802 802 802 802 
Notes: Panel A relates to the US and the time period for which USPTO patents have been assigned to state (region) in the 
NBER dataset (1964-1999).  Panel B is a larger sample: the countries for which regionalized EPO patents are available in 
OECD REGPAT (1975-2005).  Column (1) replicates our core regression (column (5) from Table 3), but restricts to the 
relevant sample for patents data. Column (2) adds in the contemporaneous growth in cumulative patent “stock” to the 
regression. Column (3) regresses the growth in patent stock on the growth in universities as a raw correlation, with no other 
controls. Column (4) then adds the standard time varying controls (reported) and geographic controls (not reported).  
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Table 9: UNIVERSITIES AND APPROVAL OF DEMOCRACY 
Dependent variable:  
Approval of Democracy 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
15 year lagged ln(1+#universities per capita) 0.0294*** 0.0257*** 0.0231** 0.0230** 
  (0.00934) (0.00960) (0.00946) (0.00997) 
Dummy for Male   0.0376*** 0.0338*** 0.0337*** 
    (0.00477) (0.00468) (0.00468) 
Age (years)   0.00177*** 0.00222*** 0.00221*** 
    (0.000300) (0.000302) (0.000302) 
Dummy for married   -0.00119 -0.00420*** -0.00407*** 
    (0.00127) (0.00126) (0.00123) 
Children   -0.00696*** -0.00342* -0.00348* 
    (0.00200) (0.00196) (0.00194) 
Employed (full, part time, self-employed)   0.0173*** 0.0239*** 0.0239*** 
    (0.00551) (0.00616) (0.00613) 
Income scale   0.0116*** 0.00540 0.00562* 
    (0.00339) (0.00329) (0.00323) 
Dummy for holds university degree     0.135*** 0.135*** 
      (0.00775) (0.00768) 
Dummy for student     0.0854*** 0.0856*** 
      (0.0116) (0.0116) 
Observations 138511 138511 138511 138511 
Adjusted R-squared 0.075 0.079 0.085 0.085 
# clusters 693 693 693 693 
Country and year dummies yes yes yes yes 
Geographic controls no no no yes 
Notes: OLS estimates, 54 countries. Standard errors are clustered at the regional level. Region controls include latitude, inverse distance to ocean, malaria ecology, ln(oil and gas production) 
1950-2010 and a dummy for if a region contains the country’s capital city.  
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Figure 1: WORLDWIDE UNIVERSITIES OVER TIME 
Panel A: University Count 
Notes: The evolution of global universities over time; years where the total number doubled are marked. Source: WHED.
Panel B: University Density and Population 
Notes: This chart shows the evolution of global university density (universities per million people) and population over time. 
Source: WHED and Maddison population data. 
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Figure 2: REGIONAL GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH AND UNIVERSITY GROWTH 
Panel A: Average growth rates, one observation per region 
Notes: 1,498 region observations are grouped equally into 20 bins, variation is within country. Source: WHED and 
Gennaioli et al. (2014) for regional GDP per capita and population 
Panel B: Average growth rates, region-year observations 
Notes: 8,128 region-year observations are grouped equally into 20 bins, variation is within country. Source: WHED and 
Gennaioli et al. (2014) for regional GDP per capita and population 
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APPENDICES: INTENDED ONLY FOR ONLINE 
PUBLICATION 
APPENDIX A1: DATA APPENDIX 
A.1.1 WHED COVERAGE 
WHED contains data on 185 countries (which includes 176 countries plus 9 administrative 
regions/dependencies: Hong Kong, Macao, Curaçao, French Guyana, French Polynesia, 
Guadeloupe, Martinique, New Caledonia and Reunion). We cross-check the 176 countries to a 
full list of independent states (from the US State Department, 
http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm) and find that there are only 16 more independent 
states not included in the database. These are Antigua and Barbuda, Comoros, Djibouti, 
Dominica, Eritrea, Grenada, Kosovo, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands and South Sudan. 
WHED contains information on higher education institutions that offer at least a post-graduate 
degree or a four year professional diploma. It  therefore excludes, for example, further 
education institutions in the UK or community colleges in the US and may be thought of as a 
sample of “higher quality” universities.  
We compare the country totals in WHED as at 2010 to data from “Webometrics” 
(http://www.webometrics.info/en/node/54), a source where higher education institutions 
(including ones that would not qualify for inclusion in WHED) are ranked by their “web 
presence”. This source puts the total number of universities worldwide at 23,887 in 2015 (part 
of this difference will be due to growth over the 2010-2015 period). In the results section, we 
discuss a robustness check where we drop countries from our regressions with a very large 
divergence between the two sources. 
A1.2 VALIDATING OUR APPROACH 
Our approach for calculating university presence by region uses the founding dates of 
universities to determine the number of universities that were present at any particular date. 
We consider that a “university” is founded on this initial founding date, even if it was a smaller 
higher education institute or college at that date. This is often the case, but our approach is 
reasonable since only the better quality institutions are likely to subsequently become 
universities. Furthermore, there are many cases where a number of universities or higher 
education institutes were merged together into what is today recorded as one university in 
WHED. Our approach avoids the apparent reduction that would occur in such cases if we were 
merely counted the number of institutions present at any given date. 
One key concern with this strategy is that it would not be suitable in a world where university 
exits are commonplace. Say a number of universities were present in the past and closed down 
before WHED 2010. A region could have actually seen a fall in universities, but our method 
would not capture this since it includes only surviving universities. Anecdotally we know that 
the period since the 1960s has been one of university growth across the globe, but we 
investigate this issue further in order to gain more comfort on the validity of our approach. We 
do this by obtaining historical records of the universities and higher education institutions 
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present in the 1960s, and assess whether significant numbers of these are missing from WHED 
2010. 
 
The appropriate sources are the predecessors to WHED: “The International Handbook of 
Universities” (1959, published by the IAU annually); “American Universities and Colleges” 
(1960, published by The American Council on Education and “The Yearbook of Universities 
of the Commonwealth” (1959), published by the Association of Universities of the British 
Commonwealth). As the name suggests, the “American Universities and Colleges” yearbook 
contains fully fledged universities, but also smaller colleges (including religious institutions), 
many of which would not be included in WHED today. The international handbook lists 
universities and other institutions not considered of “full university rank” separately. We 
include all of these institutions because the distinction is not consistent between countries – for 
example in France, these latter institutions contain all the grandes écoles which are considered 
to be of very high quality but are outside the framework of the French university system; and 
in China only one institution is listed as a full university while other institutions include a 
number of institutions with the name “university”. The Commonwealth yearbook contains only 
fully fledged universities. 
 
The main exercise we carry out is to name match between 1960 yearbooks and WHED 2010. 
There are 2,694 institutions listed across 110 countries in the three yearbooks in 1960, this 
compares with 5,372 institutions (in 132 countries) which according to WHED 2010 were 
founded pre 1960 – this is higher because WHED counts universities from the date they are 
founded, even if they are not founded as a fully-fledged university (as discussed above). The 
country level correlation of the number of universities present in 1960 in the two sources is 
0.95. The matching process involves a number of iterations: exact matching, “fuzzy” matching, 
and manual matching. The process is complex because name changes and mergers are 
commonplace, therefore internet searches on Wikipedia or university websites were necessary. 
Where an institution was found to have been merged into a university that is present in WHED 
2010 we considered it a match. The results of this process are summarized in Table A10. We 
find that university closure is extremely rare, and we only find evidence of this in the US, where 
33 small (mostly religious) colleges are present in the 1960 yearbook and were found to have 
closed down, mainly due to bankruptcy. 155 institutions worldwide were found to still be in 
existence but not be listed in WHED. This was usually because they do not meet the WHED 
listing criteria (a university that offers at least a four year degree or postgraduate courses). 
Indeed, of the 155 institutions in this category, 115 were not considered fully fledged 
universities in 1960, and 33 of the remaining 40 were US colleges (mostly religious).  
 
Based on these facts, we believe that it is reasonable to use the WHED founding dates as an 
(albeit imperfect) basis for a time series of university presence by region. 
 
A1.3 DESCRIBING UNIVERSITY GROWTH IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
 
This section gives a historical overview of the diffusion of universities from the 1880s in four 
advanced economies: France, Germany, the UK and US, and two emerging economies: India 
and China. We compare the timing of historical university expansions to growth and 
industrialisation (see Figure A5 for a measure of industrialisation over time in the UK, US, 
France and Germany sourced from Bairoch (1982)). This analysis provides a visual “sense-
check” for the thesis developed by Mokyr (2002) that the building and dissemination of 
knowledge played a major role in the Industrial Revolution.  
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In the United Kingdom, universities have been established in waves: the “Ancient universities” 
starting with Oxford in 1100s were the first seven universities which were founded before 1800. 
Then a number of universities were chartered in the 19th Century, followed by the “Red Brick” 
universities before World War I. A large expansion occurred after World War II, following the 
influential Robbins Report into Higher Education (1963). Former polytechnics were converted 
to universities in 1992, but in our data these higher education institutions are counted from 
when they opened in their original form. These waves can be seen in the university density line 
as shown in Figure A6, Panel A, which also plots national GDP per capita data (from 
Maddison), suggesting that the first expansions coincided with industrialisation in the 1800s 
(Figure A5 shows that industrialisation picked up from the 1830s in the UK). The raw 
university count trend is shown in Panel B. 
In the US, the first university was Harvard, founded in 1636. By the American Revolution there 
were nine colleges modelled on the Oxford and Cambridge in England. However these were 
very small, exclusive and focused on religion and liberal arts. At that time, there were no law 
or medical schools, so one had to study these subjects in London. It was Thomas Jefferson who 
had a vision for state education, separate from religion, but this only took hold after the Civil 
War with the land grant colleges. This sharp rise in university density can be seen in Figure 
A7. Industrialization in the US began to pick up in the 1860s (see Figure A5). University 
density reached much higher levels than in Britain: at 13 universities per million people in 1900 
versus just over 2 in the UK. The difference is that in the US, density came down again as 
population growth outpaced the opening of new universities which continued to grow as shown 
in Panel B; though the downward trend did slow during the post war period (we can see the 
slight kick in university numbers from the 1950s in Panel B). However, the fall in university 
density must be considered in the context that over the same period, university size has also 
been increasing in the US and (this can be seen in Figure A8 and in our analysis in Section IV 
on enrolments). Furthermore, there has been a sharp rise in “Community Colleges” in the US, 
which provide college access qualifications, and are not counted in our dataset. 
In France, Figure A9 shows that university density really started picking up in the 1800s with 
the opening of the “Grande Écoles” which were established to support industry, commerce and 
science and technology in the late 19th Century. Indeed industrialization in France was more 
gradual, and started picking up in the late 1880s, early 1900s. The next dramatic increase in 
universities numbers and density occurred in the 1960s during de Gaulle’s reforms of the 
French economy. 
Cantoni and Yuchtman (2014) discuss the opening of the first universities in Germany 
following the Papal schism in the late 14th Century. However, during the 1800s, Figure A10 
shows that university density actually fell, as population growth outpaced the gradual increases 
in university numbers which can be seen in Panel B. Historically, Germany had a low share of 
college graduates as higher shares of the population were educated via the apprenticeship 
system. A deliberate push to expand university education began in the 1960s, with new public 
universities founded across the country (Jäger, 2013). This was motivated by economic 
reasons; in particular the need to compete in technology and science against the backdrop of 
the Cold War; but also social reasons, namely the notion that education is a civil right to be 
extended beyond the elites, and is crucial for democracy. 
China and India saw much later expansions as shown in Figure A11 and Figure A12. China 
started opening up to Western advances in science in the 1800s, and followed Soviet influence 
in the 1950s with centrally planned education. We can see a sharp rise in university density 
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from the 1900s to 1960. The spike in the 1960s is due to the Cultural Revolution, when higher 
education institutions were shut down for 6 years, and all research terminated. When the 
universities were reopened, they taught in line with Maoist thought. It was from the 1980s that 
institutions began to gain more autonomy and when China began its rapid growth trajectory, 
though so far growth in universities has not outpaced population growth. In India, expansion 
occurred after independence in 1947. During the colonial era, the upper classes would be sent 
to England for education. The British Raj oversaw the opening of universities and colleges 
from the late 1800s, but university density only started rising more rapidly after 1947 and 
recently has picked up pace again. We note that the in both countries, there are around 0.4 
universities per million people, which is still a lot lower than in the UK or US. 
 
Finally, we note that in general, expansions in university numbers have been accompanied by 
increases in university size. As we saw in Figure A8 (using UNESCO data that are only 
available from 1970), university students normalized by population have been growing overall 
in the US and the UK since the 1970s (with a dip in the late 1990s in the US) and more recently 
in China and India.  
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APPENDIX A2: FURTHER RESULTS 
A2.1 REGRESSIONS OF GDP OER CAPITA GROWTH ON LAGGED LEVELS OF 
UNIVERSITY PRESENCE  
In Table A5 we replicate as closely as possible41 the results in Gennaioli et al. (2014) but add 
in the lagged university level into our analysis. Column (1) follows their Table 5, column (8), 
omitting years of education, and column (2) includes years of education. The coefficients are 
very similar: the convergence term is between 1.4% and 1.8%, and the coefficient on years of 
education is nearly identical at around 0.004. Adding in universities and population does not 
affect the other coefficients much. Column (3) suggests that doubling the level of universities 
leads to a 0.24% rise in the GDP per capita growth rate. Universities have a positive and 
significant effect over and above years of education. As we would expect if some of the effect 
of universities is via their production of human capital, the effect of universities is higher when 
years of education are omitted (column (3)). Table A6 presents a similar analysis, but in long 
difference format; so for each region there is one observation with the average annual growth 
rate over the 50 years to 2010, 40 years and 30 years respectively; regressed on starting period 
universities and other controls. Overall, this shows that even in this simplified specification on 
the reduced sample where the relevant data are available for the time periods, there is a positive 
significant relationship between initial period univerisities and subsequent growth once country 
fixed effects are included; and the magnitude is comparable with the conventional Barro-style 
results. 
A2.2 SIMULATION OF THE EFFECTS OF A NEW UNIVERSITY ON THE 
AVERAGE REGION’S HUMAN CAPITAL AND GDP 
To assess the plausibility of the magnitudes identified in the main text we consider some 
quantitative calcuations of university expansion. 
To look at a representative case we take the average region in the dataset as summarised in 
Table 1: a population of just under 3 million, GDP per capita of $13,056 (and hence GDP of 
$39 billion), a college share of 7%, average years of education of 7.37, and just under 10 
universities.  
We assume that a new university with a capacity of 8,500 students is opened in the region. We 
believe that a university of 8,500 students a generous size for a new university, based on to 
average enrolments in our sample countries over the years where country level enrolments data 
are available.42 The annual intake of students is 2,125, so the university is at capacity in four 
years. We assume it takes four years to graduate with a bachelors degree and a staff student 
ratio of 10,43 so that there are 850 staff present at the university from the outset. We assume 
41 Our sample is larger because for the purposes of our analysis we interpolate GDP per capita, and not just years 
of education and population as in their paper.  
42 We obtained total tertiary education enrolments from UNESCO which is available since the 1970s, and divided 
by the number of universities in our data, to get the average number of universities by country in each year where 
the data are available. The average over the period is just under 8,500. Obviously, this will represent existing as 
well as new universities. Moreover, this is likely to be an overstatement since, as we previously discussed, not all 
tertiary institutions are included in WHED. The average growth rate in students per university implied by this 
country level data over the period is 2.5% per annum. 
43 This is a generous assumption. In the UK, for example, staff-student ratios range between 9 and 25 (see 
http://www.thecompleteuniversityguide.co.uk/league-tables/rankings?o=Student-Staff%20Ratio) 
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that students enter the region to begin studying, and stay in the region post graduation, adding 
to its human capital stock. We keep the university size constant for the five year period 
following its opening. We assume that all staff enter the region in the first year of the university 
and remain there. We assume that the typical graduate has 18 years of education.  
 
This experiment involves adding one university to an existing stock of 10 universities, which 
represents a 10% increase over that period, or an average of 2% per year. To compare to our 
regression results, which represent the impacts of a 1% cent increase in universities, we need 
to double the regression coefficients. Our core coefficient on universities in column (5) of Table 
3 is 0.0445. This implies that a 1% increase in the number of universities is associated with a 
0.045% increase in GDP per capita in the subsequent 5 years. Therefore the implied increase 
in GDP per capita following a 2% change would be 0.089%.  
 
The impact of a 1% increase in universities in the previous period on college share from Table 
7, column (8) is an increase in college share of 0.0037, which represents 0.37 percentage points 
since college share is measured as a fraction. Therefore we double this to 0.007 to compare 
with the experiment. Similarly, impact on years of education is a 0.02% increase, so we double 
this to 0.04%. 
 
Using this simple example we generate impacts on college share and years of education growth 
in the next five year period and compare these to the predictions from our regressions. 
 
Our calculation involves a churning out of 2,125 new graduates per year and this results in an 
average annual rise in college share of 0.0006 (or 0.060 percentage points). This is actually 
smaller than the 0.007 implied from our regressions, and could be due to more inward migration 
of skilled people following the opening of universities, which we do not capture controlling 
only for population changes. On the other hand the implied average annual rise in years of 
education is 0.09% which is more similar to the 0.04% implied by the regressions (which, as 
we noted are based on a different sample from the college share regressions).  
 
While there are differences here, our simulation shows that the effects on human capital even 
with generous assumptions about the  size of a new university, will be relatively small. This is 
in line with what we find in the regression analysis. 
 
Demand effects of universities 
Using this same example of the representative region, we can simulate the demand effects of 
university expansion. If the university is funded from outside the area then GDP may increase 
mechanically as demand from a university (e.g. rent, supplies, building and maintence) and its 
staff and suggests boost the local economy. 
 
We assume that the cost per student in our new university is $10,000 per year, which is likely 
to be an overestimate of the average university in our sample.44 For a university of 8,500 
students this implies total costs of $85 million. Since this represents annual costs, we assume 
that the transfer continues in each subsequent year. Therefore the uplift to GDP will be felt 
only in the initial years. Assuming that total enrolments stay fixed at 8,500 over the five years 
following university entry (which is the key period we use for our regressions), there would be 
                                                 
 
44 In 2011 the OECD average tertiary education spending by educational institutions was $13,958 (see Education 
at a Glanc 2014: OECD Indicators, Indicator B1). On average OECD countries spent 41% of GDP per capita per 
student in 2011. $10,000 represents 77% of GDP per capita in our average region-year ($13,056).  
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no uplift to GDP per capita in that period. Alternatively, if we assume enrolments are growing 
by 5% per year45  this would only account for around 15% of the coefficient on universities 
implied by our baseline specification (0.089).  
 
 
A2.3 UNIVERSITIES AND DEMOCRATIC APPROVAL 
 
Figure A13 shows that there is a positive and signifcant correlation between the change in 
university density and change in polity scores over 1960-2000.  
 
Table A8 reports a number of robustness tests around the regressions of approval of democracy 
on lagged university presence reported in Table 9. Column (1) repeats Table 9 column (4). 
Column (2) shows that this effect appears to be driven by OECD countries, as an interaction 
term between an OECD dummy and the lagged university presence is positive and significant. 
Column (3) shows that the main result is much smaller in magnitude and insignificant for 5 
year lagged university presence, and actually negative for a 30 year lag. We note however, that  
the results are robust across lags on the OECD subsample (available on request). Column (5) 
shows that our main result can be closely replicated using a different survey measure for 
approval of democracy, “democracy is best” which asks respondents whether they agree with 
the statement that democracy is better than any other form of government. Column (6) does 
not include country fixed effects. This shows that the positive relationship we find  between 
universities and approval of democracy is valid within countries. Across countries, factors not 
controlled for in these regressions (such as levels of corruption) appear to influence the result. 
We investigated which countries appear to be driving this negative relationship and found, for 
example, that the Philippines (a country with high levels of corruption) has high university 
density but low approval of democracy. Column (7) clusters at the country level and 
significance holds. Column (8) weights by population, to account for the fact that some  regions 
with low population may have less representative responses. Column (9) drops students and 
graduates and the main result gets stronger. Finally, column (10) shows that the results are 
robust to estimation using an ordered-probit model.
                                                 
 
45 The average growth rate in students per university implied by the UNESCO country level enrolments data over 
the period since the 1970s is 2.5% per annum.  
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APPENDIX TABLES 
Table A1: FULL GROWTH ON LAGGED GROWTH REGRESSION 
Dependent variable:  
Regional Growth of GDP per capita 
Lagged growth in #universities 0.0445*** 
(0.0105) 
Lagged level of regional GDP per capita -0.0127*** 
(0.00131) 
Lagged level of country GDP per capita -0.0213*** 
(0.00422) 
Lagged level of population -0.0855** 
(0.0387) 
Lagged growth in population/100 -0.113*** 
(0.0385) 
Dummy for capital in region 0.0110*** 
(0.00168) 
Latitude -0.000318*** 
(0.0000875) 
Inverse distance to ocean 0.00456 
(0.00373) 
Malaria ecology 0.000736** 
(0.000292) 
log(oil and gas production) 1950-2010 0.000293** 
(0.000142) 
Observations 8128 
Adjusted R-squared 0.260 
# clusters 1498 
Notes: This table replicates Table 3, column (5) to show the geographic controls. Note, ln(oil and gas production) 1950-2010 
is not normalized by population. 
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Table A2: DISTRIBUTED LAG SPECIFICATIONS 
Dependent variable: 
Regional Growth of GDP per capita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                
Current growth in #universities   -0.000755 -0.00202 -0.0180 -0.0212* -0.0140 -0.00502 
    (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0121) (0.0128) (0.0144) (0.0164) 
5 year lagged growth in #universities 0.0445***   0.0445*** 0.0506*** 0.0457*** 0.0484*** 0.0675*** 
  (0.0105)   (0.0105) (0.0117) (0.0120) (0.0123) (0.0144) 
10 year lagged growth in #universities       0.00910 0.00636 -0.00174 0.00430 
        (0.0106) (0.0110) (0.0118) (0.0130) 
15 year lagged growth in #universities         -0.00666 -0.0210* -0.0214 
          (0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0131) 
20 year lagged growth in #universities           -0.0138 -0.0189 
            (0.0145) (0.0158) 
25 year lagged growth in #universities             0.00504 
              (0.0130) 
Observations 8128 9246 8128 6863 5635 4604 3638 
Adjusted R-squared 0.260 0.253 0.261 0.252 0.245 0.237 0.283 
# clusters 1498 1527 1498 1391 1104 1013 906 
Notes: Column (1) is replicates column (5) from Table 3. The subsequent columns add contemporaneous and further lagged growth in universities, and corresponding population growth. The 
level of population at the furthest lag is also controlled for.  
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Table A3:  UNIVERSITY GROWTH AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Dependent variable:  
Regional Growth in Number of Universities 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged growth in regional GDP per capita -0.00528 0.00157 0.00437 0.00623 0.00994 -0.00295 
  (0.0125) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0145) (0.0148) 
Lagged growth in country GDP per capita   -0.0225 -0.0231 -0.0252 -0.0384* -0.0272 
    (0.0224) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0222) (0.0222) 
Lagged growth in population     0.0774* 0.0808** 0.0808* 0.0394 
      (0.0407) (0.0411) (0.0418) (0.0412) 
Lagged level of population/100       0.262*** 0.773*** 0.814*** 
        (0.0419) (0.0801) (0.0893) 
Lagged #universities         -0.00803*** -0.00984*** 
          (0.000980) (0.00128) 
Lagged level of regional GDP per capita           0.00528*** 
            (0.00113) 
Lagged level of country GDP per capita           -0.00589* 
            (0.00312) 
Dummy for capital in region           0.00713** 
            (0.00284) 
Observations 7746 7746 7746 7746 7746 7746 
Adjusted R-squared 0.133 0.133 0.134 0.138 0.154 0.159 
# clusters 1489 1489 1489 1489 1489 1489 
Notes: All columns include country and year fixed effects, and standard errors clustered by region. Column (1) is simple correlation between regional growth in universities and the lagged 
growth in regional GDP per capita. Columns (2) to (5) include the variables shown. In addition, column (6) includes geographic controls which are not reported: latitude, inverse distance to 
ocean, malaria ecology, ln(oil and gas production) 1950-2010. Levels of GDP per capita and population are in natural logs. 
59 
 
Table A4: GROWTH REGRESSIONS BY CONTINENT 
Dependent variable: Regional growth in GDP per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sample All 
Europe & 
North 
America 
Latin 
America Asia Africa 
Lagged growth in #universities 0.0445*** 0.0172* 0.0722*** 0.0574** 0.0271 
  (0.0105) (0.00938) (0.0208) (0.0267) (0.0642) 
Lagged level of regional GDP per capita -0.0127*** -0.0162*** -0.0137*** -0.0105*** -0.0325*** 
  (0.00131) (0.00259) (0.00247) (0.00242) (0.00507) 
Lagged level of country GDP per capita -0.0213*** -0.0338*** -0.0247*** -0.0149* -0.157*** 
  (0.00422) (0.00534) (0.00688) (0.00819) (0.0505) 
Lagged level of population -0.0855** 0.0197 -0.335*** -0.0199 -0.486 
  (0.0387) (0.0450) (0.0936) (0.0793) (0.326) 
Lagged growth in population -0.113*** -0.174*** -0.109** -0.0879 0.0334 
  (0.0385) (0.0491) (0.0524) (0.100) (0.0556) 
Dummy for capital in region 0.0110*** 0.0116*** 0.0117*** 0.0168*** 0.0186*** 
  (0.00168) (0.00217) (0.00343) (0.00370) (0.00648) 
Observations 8128 3815 1821 2249 243 
Adjusted R-squared 0.260 0.445 0.206 0.211 0.357 
# clusters 1498 674 295 462 67 
Notes: Column (1) replicates column (5) from Table 3. The other columns carry out an identical regression, but restricting the sample to the sample continent as labelled. Levels of GDP per 
capita and population are in natural logs. Latin America contains Mexico, Central America and South America.
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Table A5: BARRO-STYLE REGRESSIONS WITH UNIVERSITIES 
Dependent variable:  
Regional Growth of GDP per capita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged #universities     0.00243*** 0.00189** 
      (0.000758) (0.000755) 
Lagged level of population/100     -0.235*** -0.200*** 
      (0.0679) (0.0673) 
Lagged level of regional GDP per capita -0.0141*** -0.0178*** -0.0150*** -0.0184*** 
  (0.00142) (0.00165) (0.00148) (0.00169) 
Lagged level of country GDP per capita -0.0361*** -0.0321*** -0.0356*** -0.0318*** 
  (0.00353) (0.00373) (0.00353) (0.00372) 
Lagged level of population density -0.000562 -0.00109** -0.000220 -0.000730 
  (0.000418) (0.000424) (0.000482) (0.000488) 
Lagged years of education   0.00399***   0.00386*** 
    (0.000569)   (0.000570) 
Observations 8010 8010 8010 8010 
Adjusted R-squared 0.273 0.279 0.274 0.280 
# clusters 1504 1504 1504 1504 
Notes: Column (1) replicates Gennaioli et al. (2014) Table (5), column (8), with geographic controls, year and country fixed effects, but omits years of education. There are more observations 
because we have interpolated GDP per capita in the sample (Gennaioli et al. only interpolate years of education and population). Column (2) adds years of education. Column (3) replicates 
column (1), but adds the five year lagged level of universities in a region, and lagged population. Column (4) then adds years of education to the specification in column (3). Standard errors are 
clustered at the regional level. Levels of GDP per capita, population and population density are in natural logs. Years of schooling are not logged. 
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Table A6: LONG DIFFERENCE GROWTH ON LEVELS REGRESSIONS 
Dependent Variable:  
Average annual GDP per capita growth 
50 year differences 40 year differences 30 year differences 
(1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Lagged #universities -0.000293 0.00344** -0.000764** 0.00198 0.000266 0.00239** 
  (0.000395) (0.00150) (0.000319) (0.00128) (0.000603) (0.00105) 
Lagged level of regional GDP per capita   -0.0125***   -0.00650***   -0.0127*** 
    (0.00239)   (0.00169)   (0.00164) 
Lagged level of population   -0.00257*   -0.00208*   -0.000819 
    (0.00142)   (0.00115)   (0.000875) 
Change in population   0.0832   0.0224   -0.0625 
    (0.0644)   (0.0564)   (0.0714) 
Observations 188 188 250 250 464 464 
Adjusted R-squared -0.003 0.423 0.014 0.289 -0.002 0.748 
Country fixed effects no yes no yes no yes 
Notes: This table shows long differences to 2000: so columns (1) to (2) show regressions for the sample where data are available for the period 1960-2000; and columns (3)-(4) show regressions 
for the period 1970-2000. Column (1) is a simple correlation of the average annual growth in regional GDP per capita over 1960-2000 on the natural log of 1+ the number of universities in 
1960. Column (2) adds country fixed effects, the 1960 natural log of the level of regional GDP per capita, the 1960 natural log of the level of population, the 1960-2000 change in population 
and country fixed effects. Columns (3) and (4) do the same for the 30 year difference to 2000, for which more data are available. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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Table A7: UNIVERSITIES AND YEARS OF EDUCATION 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable Δ GDPpc Δ GDPpc Δ GDPpc Δ GDPpc Δ GDPpc Δ GDPpc 
Δ Years 
Educ. 
Δ Years 
Educ. 
Lagged growth in #universities 0.0445*** 0.0531*** 0.0517*** 0.0518*** 0.0510*** 0.0516*** 0.0425*** 0.0196** 
  (0.0105) (0.0122) (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0118) (0.00774) 
Lagged growth in years of education     0.0606**   0.0490** 0.0538**     
      (0.0235)   (0.0237) (0.0242)     
Current growth in years of education       0.0678 0.0502 0.138***     
        (0.0415) (0.0417) (0.0447)     
Lagged years of education           0.00489***     
            (0.000711)     
Lagged level of regional GDP pc -0.0127*** -0.0112*** -0.0110*** -0.0110*** -0.0109*** -0.0154***   -0.00335*** 
  (0.00131) (0.00154) (0.00155) (0.00156) (0.00156) (0.00181)   (0.000518) 
Lagged level of country GDP pc -0.0213*** -0.0447*** -0.0461*** -0.0453*** -0.0463*** -0.0422***   0.00870*** 
  (0.00422) (0.00431) (0.00433) (0.00438) (0.00436) (0.00457)   (0.00212) 
Lagged level of population/100 -0.0855** -0.155*** -0.153*** -0.149*** -0.149*** -0.184***   -0.0866*** 
  (0.0387) (0.0459) (0.0458) (0.0458) (0.0458) (0.0467)   (0.0250) 
Lagged growth in population -0.113*** -0.0221 -0.0243 -0.0226 -0.0243 -0.0284   0.00711 
  (0.0385) (0.0460) (0.0460) (0.0461) (0.0460) (0.0456)   (0.0141) 
Dummy for capital in region 0.0110*** 0.0106*** 0.0108*** 0.0107*** 0.0109*** 0.00715***   -0.00215*** 
  (0.00168) (0.00189) (0.00189) (0.00189) (0.00190) (0.00181)   (0.000723) 
Observations 8128 6117 6117 6117 6117 6117 6117 6117 
Adjusted R-squared 0.260 0.288 0.289 0.289 0.290 0.299 0.203 0.627 
# clusters 1498 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 1343 
Notes: Growth in years of education is the log difference. Column (1) replicates column (5) from Table 3. Column (2) restricts to the sample for which the change in years of education is 
available. Column (3) drops the lagged growth in years of education. Column (4) adds the contemporaneous change in years of education. Column (5) includes both lagged and 
contemporaneous changes. Column (6) further adds the lagged level of years of education (unlogged). Column (7) regresses the change in years of education on the lagged growth in 
universities, with country dummies, but no other controls. Column (8) adds all the other controls. 
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Table A8: UNIVERSITIES AND APPROVAL OF DEMOCRACY 
Dependent variable:  
Approval of Democracy 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
15 year lagged ln(1+#universities per capita) 0.0294*** 0.0257*** 0.0231** 0.0230** 
  (0.00934) (0.00960) (0.00946) (0.00997) 
Dummy for Male   0.0376*** 0.0338*** 0.0337*** 
    (0.00477) (0.00468) (0.00468) 
Age (years)   0.00177*** 0.00222*** 0.00221*** 
    (0.000300) (0.000302) (0.000302) 
Dummy for married   -0.00119 -0.00420*** -0.00407*** 
    (0.00127) (0.00126) (0.00123) 
Children   -0.00696*** -0.00342* -0.00348* 
    (0.00200) (0.00196) (0.00194) 
Employed (full, part time, self-employed)   0.0173*** 0.0239*** 0.0239*** 
    (0.00551) (0.00616) (0.00613) 
Income scale   0.0116*** 0.00540 0.00562* 
    (0.00339) (0.00329) (0.00323) 
Dummy for holds university degree     0.135*** 0.135*** 
      (0.00775) (0.00768) 
Dummy for student     0.0854*** 0.0856*** 
      (0.0116) (0.0116) 
Observations 138511 138511 138511 138511 
Adjusted R-squared 0.075 0.079 0.085 0.085 
# clusters 693 693 693 693 
Country and year dummies yes yes Yes yes 
Geographic controls no no No yes 
Notes: OLS estimates, 54 countries. Standard errors are clustered at the regional level. Region controls include latitude, inverse distance to ocean, malaria ecology, ln(oil and gas production) 
1950-2010 and a dummy for if a region contains the country’s capital city.  
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Table A9: ROBUSTNESS ON WORLD VALUES SURVEY ANALYSIS 
Dependent Variable:  
View of democracy 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Approval Approval Approval Approval Best Approval Approval Approval Approval Approval 
15 year lagged ln(1+#universities 
per capita) 0.0230** 0.0137     0.0332** -0.0525*** 0.0230* 0.0547** 0.0291*** 0.0398** 
  (0.00997) (0.0120)     (0.0163) (0.0164) (0.0120) (0.0218) (0.0110) (0.0161) 
OECD dummy X 15 year lagged 
ln(1+#universities per capita)   0.0246                 
    (0.0177)                 
5 year lagged ln(1+#universities per 
capita)     0.0127               
      (0.00822)               
30 year lagged ln(1+#universities 
per capita)       -0.00213             
        (0.00913)             
Observations 138511 138511 138511 138511 48181 138511 138511 138511 100782 138511 
Adjusted R-squared 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.099 0.018 0.085 0.071 0.083   
# clusters 693 693 693 693 335 693 58 693 691 693 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS weighted 
OLS 
OLS Ordered 
probit 
Standard errors clustered at region region region region region region country region region region 
Country and year dummies yes yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes 
Sample all all all all all all all all 
drop 
students, 
graduates all 
Notes: Column (1) replicates column (4) from Table 9. Column (2) includes an OECD dummy (not reported) and interaction between this and lagged university density. Column (3) is identical 
to column (1), but uses the five year lagged university density. Column (4) uses the thirty year lagged university density. Column (5) has a different dependent variable: the view that democracy 
is “best”. Column (6) omits country and year dummies. Column (7) clusters standard errors at the country level. Column (8) uses weighted OLS, weighting each region by its population as a 
share of the country’s total population. Column (9) drops graduates and students from the sample. Column (10) is estimated using an Ordered Probit model.  
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Table A10: MATCHING WHED AND 1960 YEARBOOKS 
Outcome "University" Other Total 
Match - exact 570 65 635 
Match - fuzzy 653 138 791 
Match - manual 384 696 1080 
Not in WHED 2010 40 115 155 
Death 33 0 33 
Total 1680 1014 2694 
Notes: This table reports the outcome of the matching process between WHED and historical yearbooks, by universities and 
other types of institution. 
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APPENDIX FIGURES 
 
Figure A1: LOCATION OF UNIVERSITIES IN 2010 
 
Notes: Pie chart shows the share of worldwide universities in each country, as at 2010. Source: WHED. 
67 
Figure A2: DIFFUSION OF UNIVERSITIES ACROSS COUNTRIES 
Notes: This chart shows the total number of countries that have universities over time, with some key countries marked in 
the year they opened their first universities marked. Source: WHED.
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Figure A3: SCATTER PLOTS AT COUNTRY LEVEL, CROSS SECTION IN 2000 
Panel A: Universities and income in 2000 
 
Notes: Each observation is a country in 2000. Source: WHED and World Bank GDP per capita 
 
Panel B: Universities in 1960 and GDP per capita growth (1960-2000) 
 
Notes: Each observation is a country. Average annual growth rates over the period 1960-2000 on the y axis. Source: WHED 
and World Bank GDP per capita 
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Panel C: Universities and average years of schooling in 2000 
Notes: Each observation is a country in 2000. Source: WHED and years of schooling obtained from Barro-Lee dataset 
Panel D: Universities and patents in 2000 
Notes: Each observation is a country in 2000. Source: WHED and patents from WIPO
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Panel E: Universities and democracy in 2000 
 
Notes: Each observation is a country in 2000. Source: WHED and Polity2 scores from Polity IV project 
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Figure A4: GROWTH IN US ENROLMENTS VS GROWTH IN UNIVERSITIES 
 
Notes: Each observation is a region (US state), weighted by the region’s share in total US population in 2010. 40 year 
growth relates to the period 1970-2010. Dropping Arizona, b=0.62 and se=0.28. Source: WHED and NCES. 
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Figure A5: PER CAPITA INDUSTRIALISATION LEVELS, 1959-1913 (UK 1900=100) 
 
Notes: Graph based on Table 9, Bairoch (1982); taken from Baldwin (2012) 
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Figure A6: UNIVERSITIES AND INDUSTRIALISATION IN THE UK 
Panel A: University density and GDP per capita trends 
 
Notes: This chart shows the evolution of university density (universities per million people) and GDP per capita over time. 
Source: WHED and Maddison GDP per capita data. 
 
Panel B: University count trend 
 
Notes: This chart shows the evolution of university count over time. Source: WHED 
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Figure A7: UNIVERSITIES AND INDUSTRIALISATION IN THE US 
Panel A: University density and GDP per capita trends 
 
Notes: This chart shows the evolution of university density (universities per million people) and GDP per capita over time. 
Source: WHED and Maddison GDP per capita data. 
 
Panel B: University count trend 
 
Notes: This chart shows the evolution of university count over time. Source: WHED 
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Figure A8: TRENDS IN STUDENT NUMBERS NORMALISED BY POPULATION 
Notes: Number of students in tertiary education per million inhabitants. Source: UNESCO 
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Figure A9: UNIVERSITIES AND INDUSTRIALISATION IN FRANCE 
Panel A: University density and GDP per capita trends 
Notes: This chart shows the evolution of university density (universities per million people) and GDP per capita over time. 
Source: WHED and Maddison GDP per capita data. 
Panel B: University count trend 
Notes: This chart shows the evolution of university count over time. Source: WHED
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Figure A10: UNIVERSITIES AND INDUSTRIALISATION IN GERMANY 
Panel A: University density and GDP per capita trends 
Notes: This chart shows the evolution of university density (universities per million people) and GDP per capita over time. 
Source: WHED and Maddison GDP per capita data.
Panel B: University count trend 
Notes: This chart shows the evolution of university count over time. Source: WHED
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Figure A11: UNIVERSITIES AND INDUSTRIALISATION IN CHINA 
Panel A: University density and GDP per capita trends 
Notes: This chart shows the evolution of university density (universities per million people) and GDP per capita over time. 
Source: WHED and Maddison GDP per capita data. 
Panel B: University count trend 
Notes: This chart shows the evolution of university count over time. Source: WHED
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Figure A12: UNIVERSITIES AND INDUSTRIALISATION IN INDIA 
Panel A: University density and GDP per capita trends 
Notes: This chart shows the evolution of university density (universities per million people) and GDP per capita over time. 
Source: WHED and Maddison GDP per capita data. 
Panel B: University count trend 
Notes: This chart shows the evolution of university count over time. Source: WHED
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Figure A13: CHANGE IN UNIVERSITIES AND CHANGE IN DEMOCRACY 
Notes: Each observation is a country in 2000. Source: WHED and Polity 2 variable from Polity IV 
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